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Abstract
We propose a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio man-
agement. A competitive investor can invest through an index fund or an active fund run by
a manager with unknown ability. Following a negative cashflow shock to assets held by the
active fund, the investor updates negatively about the manager’s ability and migrates to the
index fund. While prices of assets held by the active fund drop in anticipation of the investor’s
outflows, the drop is expected to continue, leading to momentum. Because outflows push prices
below fundamental values, expected returns eventually rise, leading to reversal. Fund flows
generate comovement and lead-lag effects, with predictability being stronger for assets with
high idiosyncratic risk. We derive explicit solutions for asset prices, within a continuous-time
normal-linear equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Two of the most prominent financial-market anomalies are momentum and reversal. Momentum
is the tendency of assets with good (bad) recent performance to continue overperforming (under-
performing) in the near future. Reversal concerns predictability based on a longer performance
history: assets that performed well (poorly) over a long period tend to subsequently underperform
(overperform). Closely related to reversal is the value effect, whereby the ratio of an asset’s price
relative to book value is negatively related to subsequent performance. Momentum and reversal
have been documented extensively and for a wide variety of assets, ranging from individual stocks
to industry- and country-level stock portfolios, to bonds, commodities and currencies.1
Momentum and reversal are viewed as anomalies because they are hard to explain within
the standard asset-pricing paradigm with rational agents and frictionless markets. The prevalent
explanations of these phenomena are behavioral, and assume that agents react incorrectly to infor-
mation signals.2 In this paper we show that momentum and reversal can arise in markets where all
agents are rational. We depart from the standard paradigm by assuming that investors delegate
the management of their portfolios to financial institutions, such as mutual funds and hedge funds.
Our explanation emphasizes the role of fund flows, and the flows’ relationship to fund per-
formance. It can be summarized as follows. Suppose that a negative shock hits the fundamental
value of some assets. Investment funds holding these assets realize low returns, triggering outflows
by investors who update negatively about the ability of the managers running these funds. As a
consequence of the outflows, funds sell assets they own, and this depresses further the prices of
the assets hit by the original shock. If, in addition, outflows are gradual because of institutional
constraints (e.g., lock-up periods, institutional decision lags), the selling pressure causes prices to
decrease gradually, leading to momentum.3 At the same time, because outflows push prices below
fundamental value, expected returns eventually rise, leading to reversal.
1Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document momentum for individual US stocks, predicting returns over horizons
of 3-12 months by returns over the past 3-12 months. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) document reversal, predicting
returns over horizons of up to 5 years by returns over the past 3-5 years. Fama and French (1992) document the value
effect. This evidence has been extended to stocks in other countries (Fama and French 1998, Rouwenhorst 1998),
industry-level portfolios (Grinblatt and Moskowitz 1999), country indices (Asness, Liew, and Stevens 1997, Bhojraj
and Swaminathan 2006), bonds (Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen 2008), currencies (Bhojraj and Swaminathan 2006)
and commodities (Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst 2008). Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2008) extend and unify
much of this evidence and contain additional references.
2See, for example, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong and
Stein (1999), and Barberis and Shleifer (2003).
3That gradual outflows cause prices to decrease gradually is not an obvious result: why would rational agents hold
losing stocks when these are expected to drop further in price? This result is key to our explanation of momentum,
and we present the intuition later in the Introduction.
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In addition to deriving momentum and reversal with rational agents, we contribute to the
asset-pricing literature by building a parsimonious model of equilibrium under delegated portfo-
lio management. Delegation, to institutions such as mutual funds and hedge funds, is important
in many markets. And while investors let fund managers invest on their behalf, they move across
funds, generating flows that are large and linked to the funds’ past performance.4 Yet, incorporating
delegation and fund flows into asset-pricing models is a daunting task: it entails modeling portfolio
choice by managers (over assets) and investors (over funds), investor learning about managerial
ability (to generate a performance-flow relationship), multiple assets (to study cross-sectional phe-
nomena), all in an equilibrium setting. Our model includes these elements.
Section 2 presents the model. We consider an infinite-horizon continuous-time economy with
one riskless and multiple risky assets. We refer to the risky assets as stocks, but they could also
be interpreted as industry-level portfolios, asset classes, etc. The economy is populated by a com-
petitive investor and a competitive fund manager. The investor can invest in stocks through an
index fund that holds the market portfolio, and through an active fund. The manager determines
the active fund’s portfolio, and can invest his personal wealth in stocks through that fund. Both
agents are infinitely lived and maximize expected utility of intertemporal consumption. In addition,
exogenous buy-and-hold investors hold stocks in different proportions than in the market portfo-
lio. We introduce these investors so that the active fund can add value over the index fund: it
overweighs “high residual supply” stocks, which are in low demand by buy-and-hold investors and
thus underpriced, and underweighs “low residual supply” stocks, which are in high demand and
overpriced.5 The investor receives the return of the active fund net of an exogenous time-varying
cost, which can be interpreted as a managerial perk or a reduced form for low managerial ability.
Section 3 solves the model in the benchmark case of symmetric information, where the investor
observes the manager’s cost. When the cost increases, the investor reduces her position in the active
fund and migrates to the index fund. This amounts to a net sale of stocks in high residual supply
(active overweighs), and net purchase of stocks in low residual supply (active underweighs). The
manager takes the other side of this transaction through a change in his stake in the active fund.6
4According to the New York Stock Exchange Factbook, the fraction of stocks held directly by individuals in 2002
was less than 40%. The importance of fund flows and the link to past performance have been documented extensively.
See, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) for mutual funds, and Ding, Getmansky,
Liang and Wermers (2008) and Fund, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008) for hedge funds.
5Alternatively, we could dispense with buy-and-hold investors and the index fund, and introduce a second active
fund. The two active funds could be holding different portfolios because of differences in beliefs between their
managers. Heterogeneous beliefs, however, would complicate the model without changing the basic mechanisms.
6The manager performs a dual role in our model: select the active portfolio and take the other side of the investor’s
transactions. We could separate the two roles by ignoring the manager’s personal wealth and introducing “smart-
money” investors who can hold individual stocks directly and act as counterparty to the fund investor. This would
complicate the model without changing the main results. Note that transactions between investor and manager
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Because the manager is risk-averse, the investor’s flows affect prices: stocks in high residual supply
become cheaper and stocks in low residual supply become more expensive. Thus, the mispricing
that the active fund exploits becomes more severe.
The investor’s flows affect the statistical properties of stock returns. Because they impact
stocks in high and stocks in low residual supply in opposite directions, they increase comovement
within each group, while reducing comovement across groups. Flows also generate return reversal:
for example, when the investor moves out of the active fund, stocks in high residual supply become
cheaper, and their expected returns rise because fundamental values do not change.
Section 4 considers the more realistic case of asymmetric information, where the investor does
not observe the cost and must infer it from fund performance. We solve the inference problem using
recursive (Kalman) filtering, and show that the investor learns about the cost by benchmarking
the return of the active fund to that of the index. Because of learning, fund returns trigger flows
by the investor, and, in turn, flows feed back into returns generating amplification. Suppose, for
example, that a stock in low residual supply is hit by a positive cashflow shock. This raises the
return of the active fund, but the index return rises even more because the stock’s index weight
exceeds the active weight. As a result, the investor infers that the cost has increased and migrates
to the index fund. This generates net demand for the stock and amplifies the effect of the original
shock.
The analysis of asymmetric information bears surprising similarities with symmetric informa-
tion. For example, in both cases the covariance matrix of returns is the sum of a fundamental
component, driven purely by cashflows, and a non-fundamental one, driven by fund flows. The
former is identical across the two cases, while the latter is identical up to a multiplicative scalar.
Thus, flows increase comovement between two stocks under asymmetric information if they do so
under symmetric information. The multiplicative scalar is larger under asymmetric information,
implying that stocks’ non-fundamental volatility and comovement are larger. This is because of
the amplification effect, present only under asymmetric information. Thus, asymmetric informa-
tion at the micro level impacts volatility and comovement at the macro level. Under asymmetric
information, flows generate return reversal for the same reasons as under symmetric information.
Section 5 extends the analysis of asymmetric information to the case where the investor can
adjust only gradually her position in the active fund (because of, e.g., institutional constraints).7
take place because the cost reduces only the investor’s return from the active fund and not the manager’s. This is
consistent with the interpretation of the cost as a managerial perk. It is also consistent with the setting where the
manager’s personal wealth is ignored, and the investor’s counterparty are smart-money investors who do not invest
through the active fund. We discuss these issues in more detail in Section 2.
7Gradual adjustment can be studied under symmetric or asymmetric information. We focus on asymmetric
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When adjustment is gradual, reversal is preceded by momentum. Suppose, for example, that a
stock in high residual supply is hit by a negative cashflow shock. The investor infers that the cost
has increased and migrates gradually over time to the index fund. Because outflows are anticipated
and result in net sales of the stock, they trigger an immediate price drop, rendering the stock cheap
relative to fundamental value. Surprisingly, however, the drop is expected to continue, leading to
momentum. The intuition why the manager holds the stock despite expecting it to underperform
is as follows. Because the stock is undervalued, it will eventually overperform, “guaranteeing” the
manager a high long-horizon expected return. The manager could earn an even higher expected
return by not holding the stock during the period of expected underperformance and buying when
that period ends. This, however, is a gamble because the high expected return could disappear if
the stock overperforms during that period, approaching again fundamental value.8
Our model delivers a number of additional predictions. For example, momentum and reversal
are stronger for stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. They also become stronger when the manager’s
risk aversion increases relative to the investor’s, and when there is more uncertainty about the
manager’s cost. In the latter two cases, momentum also strengthens relative to reversal. Finally,
flows generate cross-asset predictability (lead-lag effects). For example, a negative return by a stock
in high residual supply predicts not only negative returns by the same stock in the short run and
positive in the long run, but also negative (positive) returns by other stocks in high (low) residual
supply in the short run and conversely in the long run.
Momentum and reversal have mainly been derived in behavioral models.9 In Barberis, Shleifer
and Vishny (1998), momentum arises because investors view random-walk earnings as mean-
reverting and under-react to news. In Hong and Stein (1999), prices under-react to news because
information diffuses slowly across investors and those last to receive it do not infer it from prices.
In Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), overconfident investors over-react to news be-
cause they underestimate the noise in their signals. Over-reaction builds up over time, leading to
momentum, because the self-attribution bias makes investors gradually more overconfident.
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) is the behavioral model closest to our work. They assume that
stocks belong in styles and are traded between switchers, who over-extrapolate performance trends,
information because the additional complexity is small but there is a gain in realism and additional results.
8The following three-period example illustrates the point. A stock is expected to pay off at 100 in Period 2. The
stock price is 91 in Period 0, and 85 or 95 in Period 1 with equal probabilities. Buying the stock in Period 0 earns
the manager a two-period expected capital gain of 9. Buying in Period 1 earns an expected capital gain of 15 if the
price is 85 and 5 if the price is 95. A risk-averse manager might prefer earning 9 rather than 15 or 5 with equal
probabilities, even though the expected capital gain between Period 0 and 1 is negative.
9See, however, Albuquerque and Miao (2008) for an asymmetric-information model.
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and fundamental investors. Following a stock’s bad performance, switchers become pessimistic
about the future performance of the corresponding style, and switch to other styles. Because
the extrapolation rule involves lags, switching is gradual and leads to momentum. Crucial to
momentum is that fundamental investors are also irrational and do not anticipate the switchers’
flows. In addition to providing a rational explanation, our model emphasizes the role of delegated
portfolio management and the flows between investment funds.
Our emphasis on fund flows as generators of comovement and momentum is consistent with
recent empirical findings. Coval and Stafford (2007) find that mutual funds experiencing large
outflows engage in distressed selling of their stock portfolios. Anton and Polk (2008) show that
comovement between stocks is larger when these are held by many mutual funds in common,
controlling for style characteristics. Lou (2008) predicts flows into mutual funds by the funds’
past performance, and imputes flows into individual stocks according to stocks’ weight in funds’
portfolios. He shows that flows into stocks can explain up to 50% of stock-level momentum,
especially for large stocks and in recent data where mutual funds are more prevalent.
The equilibrium implications of delegated portfolio management are the subject of a growing
literature. A central theme in that literature is that when poor performance triggers outflows
because of an exogenous performance-flow relationship (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Vayanos 2004),
a lower bound on the equity stake of fund managers (He and Krishnamurthy 2008ab), or learning
about managerial ability (Dasgupta and Prat 2008, Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo 2008, Guerreri and
Kondor 2008, Malliaris and Yan 2008), the effects of exogenous shocks on prices are amplified.10
Besides addressing momentum and reversal, we contribute to that literature methodologically by
bringing the analysis of delegation within a tractable normal-linear framework. Our framework
delivers explicit solutions for asset prices, unlike in many previous papers, while also adding new
features such as multiple assets and costs of adjustment.
2 Model
Time t is continuous and goes from zero to infinity. There are N risky assets and a riskless asset.
We refer to the risky assets as stocks, but they could also be interpreted as industry-level portfolios,
asset classes, etc. The riskless asset has an exogenous, continuously compounded return r. The
stocks pay dividends over time. We denote by Dnt the cumulative dividend of stock n = 1, .., N ,
10Equilibrium models of delegated portfolio management that do not emphasize the performance-flow relationship
include Cuoco and Kaniel (2008) and Petajisto (2008).
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and assume that the vector Dt ≡ (D1t, ..,DNt)
′ follows the process
dDt = Ftdt+ σdB
D
t , (1)
where Ft ≡ (F1t, .., FNt)
′ is a time-varying drift equal to the instantaneous expected dividend, σ is
a constant matrix of diffusion coefficients, BDt is a d-dimensional Brownian motion, and v
′ denotes
the transpose of the vector v. The expected dividend Ft follows the process
dFt = κ(F¯ − Ft)dt + φσdB
F
t (2)
where κ is a mean-reversion parameter, F¯ is a long-run mean, φ is a positive scalar, and BFt is
a d-dimensional Brownian motion. The Brownian motions BDt and B
F
t are independent of each
other. The diffusion matrices for Dt and Ft are proportional for simplicity. Each stock is in supply
of one share—a normalization since we can redefine Ft and σ. We denote by St ≡ (S1t, .., SNt)
′ the
vector of stock prices.
Part of each stock’s supply is held by an exogenous set of agents who do not trade. These
agents could be the firm’s managers or founding families, or unmodeled investors.11 We denote
by 1 − θn the number of shares of stock n held by these agents, and refer to θ ≡ (θ1, .., θN ) as
the residual-supply portfolio. While all stocks are in equal supply of one share, they can enter
the residual-supply portfolio in different proportions. Therefore, the residual-supply portfolio can
differ from the market portfolio 1 ≡ (1, .., 1), in which all stocks enter according to their supply.
Allowing the two portfolios to differ is important for our analysis because it generates a benefit of
investing in an active fund over an index fund that holds the market portfolio. We assume that θ
remains constant over time.
The remaining agents are a competitive investor and a competitive fund manager. The investor
can invest in the riskless asset and in two funds that hold only stocks: an index fund that holds
the market portfolio, and an active fund. We normalize one share of the index fund to equal
the market portfolio, i.e., one share of each stock, and refer to the market portfolio as the index
portfolio. The portfolio of the active fund is determined by the manager. The investor determines
optimally how to allocate her wealth between the riskless asset, the index fund, and the active
fund. She maximizes expected utility of intertemporal consumption. Utility is exponential, i.e.,
−E
∫ ∞
0
exp(−αct − βt)dt, (3)
11Investors could select specific stocks because of, e.g., tax reasons.
6
where α is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, ct is consumption, and β is a discount factor.
The investor cannot invest in individual stocks directly. We denote by xt and yt the number of
shares of the index and active fund, respectively, held by the investor.
The manager determines the portfolio of the active fund. This portfolio is accessible to the
investor, but also to the manager who can invest his personal wealth in the fund. The manager
determines optimally the active fund’s portfolio and the allocation of his wealth between the risk-
less asset and the fund. He maximizes expected utility of intertemporal consumption. Utility is
exponential, i.e.,
−E
∫ ∞
0
exp(−α¯c¯t − βt)dt, (4)
where α¯ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, c¯t is consumption, and β is the same discount
factor as for the investor. The manager can invest in stocks only through the active fund. We
denote by y¯t the number of shares of the active fund held by the manager.
Allowing the manager to invest his personal wealth in the active fund is a convenient modeling
assumption. It generates a well-defined objective that the manager maximizes when choosing the
fund’s portfolio. Moreover, the manager acts as trading counterparty to the investor: when the
investor reduces her holdings of the active fund, effectively selling the stocks held by the fund, the
manager takes the other side by raising his stake in the fund. Under the alternative assumption
that the manager’s personal wealth is invested in the riskless asset (or is ignored), we would need
to specify the manager’s objective. We would also need to introduce additional “smart-money”
investors, who would hold individual stocks directly and act as counterparty to the fund investor.
This would complicate the model without changing the main results.
The investor incurs a cost of investing in the active fund. This cost can be interpreted as a
managerial perk or a reduced form for low managerial ability.12 We consider the benchmark case
where the cost is observable, but mainly focus on the case where the investor does not observe the
cost and must infer it from the fund’s performance. Such inference generates a positive relationship
between performance and fund flows, which is at the heart of our analysis. We model the cost as a
flow (i.e., the cost between t and t+dt is of order dt), and assume that the flow cost is proportional
12An example of a managerial perk is late trading, whereby managers use their privileged access to the fund to
buy or sell fund shares at stale prices. Late trading was common in many funds and led to the 2003 mutual-fund
scandal. A related example is soft-dollar commissions, whereby funds inflate their brokerage commissions to pay for
services that mainly benefit managers, e.g., promote the fund to new investors, or facilitate managers’ late trading.
Managerial ability could concern the quality of trade execution or of stock-picking. Stock-picking could be modeled
explicitly in a setting where the active fund trades with other investors (e.g., smart-money). Indeed, in such a setting,
the active fund’s performance would depend on the quality of the manager’s information.
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to the number of shares yt that the investor holds in the fund. We denote the coefficient of
proportionality by Ct and assume that it follows the process
dCt = κ(C¯ − Ct)dt + sdB
C
t , (5)
where the mean-reversion parameter κ is the same as for Ft for simplicity, C¯ is a long-run mean,
and BCt is a one-dimensional Brownian motion independent of B
D
t and B
F
t .
The manager does not incur the cost Ct on his personal investment in the active fund. This
is consistent with the interpretation of Ct as a managerial perk. It is also consistent with the
alternative setting where the manager’s personal wealth is ignored, and the investor’s counterparty
are smart-money investors who hold individual stocks directly and are therefore not affected by Ct.
The gross return of the active fund is made of the dividends and capital gains of the stocks
held by the fund. The net return that accrues to the investor is the gross return minus the cost.
The gross and net returns of the index fund are computed similarly and coincide because the index
fund entails no cost. The investor observes the returns and share prices of the index and active
funds. The manager observes this information, as well as the price and return of each individual
stock, and the expected dividend Ft.
We allow the manager to derive a benefit from the investor’s participation in the active fund.
This benefit can be interpreted as a perk or a fee. Because of the benefit, the manager cares about
fund inflows and outflows. We model the benefit as a flow (i.e., the benefit between t and t + dt
is of order dt), and assume that the flow benefit is proportional to the number of shares yt that
the investor holds in the fund. We denote the coefficient of proportionality by B and assume for
simplicity that it is constant over time.
Introducing the benefit B allows for a flexible specification of the manager’s objective. When
B = 0, the manager cares about fund performance only through his personal investment in the fund,
and his objective is similar to the fund investor’s.13 When B > 0, the manager is also concerned
about the “commercial risk” that the investor might reduce her participation in the fund. In later
sections we show that B affects only the average mispricing, but is not a determinant of momentum,
13The two objectives are not identical: the manager, who can invest in stocks only through the active fund, prefers
the active portfolio to be well-diversified, while the investor can achieve diversification through the index fund.
Restricting the manager to the active portfolio eliminates the indeterminacy problem that the active portfolio is
unique only up to combinations with the index portfolio. Indeed, the manager could mix the active portfolio with the
index, and offer that portfolio to the investor, while achieving the same personal portfolio through an offsetting short
position in the index. The notion that active-fund managers over-diversify is empirically plausible. For example,
Cohen, Polk and Silli (2008) find that managers maintain well-diversified portfolios even though the stocks receiving
the largest weights in these portfolios (the managers’ “best ideas”) have large positive alphas.
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reversal and comovement.14
The investor’s cost and manager’s benefit are assumed proportional to yt for analytical conve-
nience. At the same time, these variables are sensitive to how shares of the active fund are defined
(e.g., they change with a stock split). We define one share of the fund by the requirement that
its market value equals the equilibrium market value of the entire fund. Under this definition, the
number of fund shares held by the investor and the manager in equilibrium sum to one, i.e.,
yt + y¯t = 1. (6)
In equilibrium, the active fund’s portfolio is equal to the residual-supply portfolio θ minus the
investor’s holdings xt1 of the index fund. Therefore, the equilibrium market value of the fund is
(θ−xt1)St. If the manager deviates from equilibrium and chooses one share to be zt ≡ (z1t, .., zNt),
then zt must satisfy
ztSt = (θ − xt1)St. (7)
3 Symmetric Information
We start with the benchmark case where the cost Ct is observable by both the investor and the
manager. We look for an equilibrium in which stock prices take the form
St =
F¯
r
+
Ft − F¯
r + κ
− (a0 + a1Ct), (8)
where (a0, a1) are two constant vectors. The first two terms are the present value of expected
dividends, discounted at the riskless rate r, and the last term is a risk premium linear in the cost
Ct. The investor’s holdings of the active fund in our conjectured equilibrium are
yt = b0 − b1Ct, (9)
where (b0, b1) are constants. We expect b1 to be positive, i.e., the investor reduces her investment
in the fund when Ct is high. We refer to an equilibrium satisfying (8) and (9) as linear.
14If the benefit B is a perk that the manager extracts from investors by imposing the cost Ct, a constant B implies
that perk extraction is less efficient when Ct is high. Our analysis can be extended to the case where perk extraction is
efficient (B = Ct), and more generally to the case where B is a linear function of Ct. Our focus is not to examine the
effects of time-variation in B, but rather how the manager’s concern with commercial risk (B > 0) affects equilibrium
prices.
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3.1 Manager’s Optimization
The manager chooses the active fund’s portfolio zt, the number y¯t of fund shares that he owns, and
consumption c¯t. The manager’s budget constraint is
dWt = rWtdt + y¯tzt(dDt + dSt − rStdt) +Bytdt − c¯tdt. (10)
The first term is the return from the riskless asset, the second term is the return from the active
fund in excess of the riskless asset, the third term is the manager’s benefit from the investor’s
participation in the fund, and the fourth term is consumption. To compute the return from the
active fund, we note that if one share of the fund corresponds to zt shares of the stocks, the
manager’s effective stock holdings are y¯tzt shares. These holdings are multiplied by the vector
dRt ≡ dDt+dSt−rStdt of the stocks’ excess returns per share (referred to as returns, for simplicity).
Using (1), (2), (5) and (8), we can write the vector of returns as
dRt =
[
ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1C¯
]
dt+ σ
(
dBDt +
φdBFt
r + κ
)
− sa1dBCt. (11)
Returns depend only on the cost Ct, and not on the expected dividend Ft. The covariance matrix
of returns is
Covt(dRt, dR
′
t) =
(
fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1
)
dt, (12)
where f ≡ 1 + φ2/(r + κ)2 and Σ ≡ σσ′. The matrix fΣ represents the covariance driven purely
by dividend (i.e., cashflow) news, and we refer to it as fundamental covariance. The matrix s2a1a
′
1
represents the additional covariance introduced by flows into the index and active funds, and we
refer to it as non-fundamental covariance.
The manager’s optimization problem is to choose controls (c¯t, y¯t, zt) to maximize the expected
utility (4) subject to the budget constraint (10), the normalization (7), and the investor’s holding
policy (9). We conjecture that the manager’s value function is
V¯ (Wt, Ct) ≡ − exp
[
−
(
rα¯Wt + q¯0 + q¯1Ct +
1
2
q¯11C
2
t
)]
, (13)
where (q¯0, q¯1, q¯11) are constants. The Bellman equation is
max
c¯t,y¯t,zt
[
− exp(−α¯c¯t) +DV¯ − βV¯
]
= 0, (14)
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where DV¯ is the drift of the process V¯ under the controls (c¯t, y¯t, zt). Proposition 1 shows that
the value function (13) satisfies the Bellman equation if (q¯0, q¯1, q¯11) satisfy a system of three scalar
equations. We derive these equations explicitly after imposing market clearing, in the proof of
Proposition 3
Proposition 1 The value function (13) satisfies the Bellman equation (14) if (q¯0, q¯1, q¯11) satisfy
a system of three scalar equations.
In the proof of Proposition 1 we show that the optimization over (c¯t, y¯t, zt) can be reduced
to optimization over the manager’s consumption c¯t and effective stock holdings zˆt ≡ y¯tzt. Given
zˆt, the decomposition between y¯t and zt is determined by the normalization (7). The first-order
condition with respect to zˆt is
Et(dRt) = rα¯Covt(dRt, zˆtdRt) + (q¯1 + q¯11Ct)Covt(dRt, dCt). (15)
Eq. (15) can be viewed as a pricing equation. Expected stock returns must compensate the manager
for risk. A stock’s risk is determined by the contribution to the manager’s portfolio variance (first
term in the right-hand side), and by the covariance with Ct (second term in the right-hand side).
3.2 Investor’s Optimization
The investor chooses a number of shares xt in the index fund and yt in the active fund, and
consumption ct. The investor’s budget constraint is
dWt = rWtdt + xt1dRt + yt (ztdRt − Ctdt)− ctdt. (16)
The first three terms are the returns from the riskless asset, the index fund, and the active fund
(net of the cost Ct), and the fourth term is consumption. The investor’s optimization problem is
to choose controls (ct, xt, yt) to maximize the expected utility (3) subject to the budget constraint
(16). The investor takes the active fund’s portfolio zt as given and equal to its equilibrium value
θ − xt1. We conjecture that the investor’s value function is
V (Wt, Ct) ≡ − exp
[
−
(
rαWt + q0 + q1Ct +
1
2
q11C
2
t
)]
, (17)
where (q0, q1, q11) are constants. The Bellman equation is
max
ct,xt,yt
[− exp(−αct) +DV − βV ] = 0, (18)
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where DV is the drift of the process V under the controls (ct, xt, yt). Proposition 2 shows that
the value function (17) satisfies the Bellman equation (18) if (q0, q1, q11) satisfy a system of three
scalar equations. The proposition shows additionally that the optimal control yt is linear in Ct, as
conjectured in (9).
Proposition 2 The value function (17) satisfies the Bellman equation (18) if (q0, q1, q11) satisfy
a system of three scalar equations. The optimal control yt is linear in Ct.
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that the first-order conditions with respect to xt and yt
are
Et(1dRt) = rαCovt [1dRt, (xt1+ ytzt)dRt] + (q1 + q11Ct)Covt(1dRt, dCt), (19)
Et(ztdRt)− Ctdt = rαCovt [ztdRt, (xt1+ ytzt)dRt] + (q1 + q11Ct)Covt(ztdRt, dCt), (20)
respectively. Eqs. (19) and (20) are analogous to the manager’s first-order condition (15) in that
they equate expected returns to risk. The difference with (15) is that the investor is constrained to
two portfolios rather than N individual stocks. Eq. (15) is a vector equation with N components,
while (19) and (20) are scalar equations derived by pre-multiplying expected returns with the
vectors 1 and zt of index- and active-fund weights. Note that the investor’s expected return from
the active fund in (20) is net of the cost Ct.
3.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the active fund’s portfolio zt is equal to θ−xt1, and the shares held by the manager
and the investor sum to one. Combining these equations with the first-order conditions (15), (19)
and (20), and the value-function equations (Propositions 1 and 2), yields a system of equations
characterizing a linear equilibrium. Proposition 3 shows that this system has a unique solution.
For notational convenience, we set
∆ ≡ θΣθ′1Σ1′ − (1Σθ′)2.
The constant ∆ is positive and becomes zero when the vectors 1 and θ are collinear.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique linear equilibrium. The vector a1 is given by
a1 = γ1Σp
′
f , (21)
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where γ1 is a positive constant and
pf ≡ θ −
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
1. (22)
As a first illustration of Proposition 3, consider the benchmark case where delegation is costless
because the investor’s cost Ct of investing in the active fund is constant and equal to zero. This
case can be derived by setting the long-run mean C¯ and the diffusion coefficient s to zero. When
Ct = C¯ = s = 0, the investor holds
yt = b0 =
α¯
α+ α¯
(23)
shares in the active fund and zero shares in the index fund.15 The investor holds only the active
fund because it offers a superior portfolio than the index fund at no cost. The relative shares of
the investor and the manager in the active fund are determined by their risk-aversion coefficients.
Stocks’ expected returns are
Et(dRt) = ra0dt =
rαα¯
α+ α¯
Covt(dRt, θdRt), (24)
and are thus determined by the covariance with the residual-supply portfolio θ. The intuition is
that because the index fund receives zero investment, the residual-supply portfolio coincides with
the active portfolio zt. Therefore, it also coincides with the manager’s portfolio, and prices all
stocks. Note that when Ct = C¯ = s = 0, the covariance matrix of returns fΣ + s
2a1a
′
1 is only
cashflow driven and equal to fΣ.
Consider next the case where Ct varies over time. Following an increase in Ct, the investor
reduces her investment yt in the active fund. At the same time, because investing in the index
fund is costless, the investor increases her investment xt in that fund to maintain a constant overall
exposure to the index. The net change to the investor’s portfolio is proportional to the flow portfolio
pf ≡ θ −
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
1.
The flow portfolio consists of the residual-supply portfolio θ, plus a position in the index that
renders the covariance with the index equal to zero.16 By reducing her investment in the active
15Eq. (23) follows from (9) and (A.39). Eq. xt = 0 follows from (23) and (A.30). Eq. (24) follows from (11), (12)
and (A.40).
16 The covariance between the index and the flow portfolio is 1(fΣ + s2a1a
′
1)p
′
fdt. It is equal to zero because of
1Σp′f = 0 and (21).
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fund, the investor is effectively selling a slice of the residual-supply portfolio. At the same time,
she increases her investment in the index fund, thus buying a slice of the index portfolio. Because
the investor maintains a constant overall exposure to the index, the net change in her portfolio is
uncorrelated with the index, and is thus proportional to the flow portfolio. We use the term flow
portfolio because it refers to a flow of assets from the investor to the manager.
The flow portfolio is a long-short portfolio. Long positions are in stocks whose residual supply
is large and whose weight in the active fund exceeds that in the index. Conversely, short positions
are in stocks whose residual supply is small and whose active weight is below the index weight.17
When Ct increases, the investor sells a slice of the flow portfolio, lowering her effective holdings of
stocks corresponding to the long positions and raising those corresponding to the short positions.
Eqs. (8) and (21) imply that the effect of Ct on stock prices is
∂St
∂Ct
= −γ1Σp
′
f .
An increase in Ct lowers the prices of stocks that covary positively with the flow portfolio and raises
the prices of stocks covarying negatively.18 The intuition is that when Ct increases, the manager
acquires a slice of the flow portfolio from the investor.19 As a result, he requires higher expected
returns from stocks that covary positively with the flow portfolio, and the price of these stocks
decreases. Conversely, the expected returns of stocks that covary negatively with the flow portfolio
decrease, and their price increases. Lemma 1 characterizes the covariance between a stock and the
flow portfolio in terms of the stock’s idiosyncratic risk.
Lemma 1 The covariance between stock returns and the return of the flow portfolio is
Covt(dRt, pfdRt) = Covt(dǫt, pfdǫt), (25)
where dǫt ≡ (dǫ1t, .., dǫNt)
′ denotes the residual from a regression of stock returns dRt on the index
return 1dRt.
17Stock n receives positive weight in the flow portfolio if
θn −
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
> 0⇔ θn − xt −
1Σ(θ − xt1)
′
1Σ1′
> 0⇔ znt −
1Σz′t
1Σ1′
> 0⇔
znt
1Σz′t
>
1
1Σ1′
.
The left-hand side can be interpreted as stock n’s weight in the active fund, and the right-hand side as the stock’s
weight in the index fund. Note that these are not standard portfolio weights because the denominator involves the
matrix Σ rather than the identity matrix.
18The covariance between stocks and the flow portfolio is (fΣ + s2a1a
′
1)p
′
fdt. Eq. (A.43) implies that this vector
is proportional to Σp′f .
19This is accomplished through an increase in the manager’s personal stake in the fund, and through a change in
the fund’s composition.
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Lemma 1 implies that a stock covaries positively with the flow portfolio if its idiosyncratic
movement dǫnt (i.e., the part of its return that is orthogonal to the index) covaries positively with
the idiosyncratic movement of the flow portfolio. This is likely to occur when the stock is in large
residual supply, because it then receives positive weight in the flow portfolio, or when the stock’s
idiosyncratic movement covaries positively with other stocks in large residual supply.
While residual supply determines the sign of a stock’s covariance with the flow portfolio, id-
iosyncratic risk determines the magnitude. A stock carrying no idiosyncratic risk is uncorrelated
with the flow portfolio, regardless of its residual supply. Therefore, it is unaffected by changes
in Ct, and carries no commercial risk from the manager’s viewpoint. The intuition is that while
changes in Ct prompt the investor to reallocate wealth between the active and the index fund, they
do not affect her overall willingness to carry market risk. Changes in Ct thus have no effect on the
index price, or on any other portfolio carrying only market risk; they affect only the cross-sectional
dispersion of stock prices around the index.20
The response of stock prices to Ct is reflected in expected returns. Corollary 1 shows that
expected returns are given by a two-factor model, with the factors being the index and the flow
portfolio.
Corollary 1 Stocks’ expected returns are given by
Et(dRt) =
rαα¯
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Covt(dRt,1dRt) + ΛtCovt(dRt, pfdRt), (26)
where
Λt ≡
rαα¯
α+ α¯
+
γ1
f +
s2γ2
1
∆
1Σ1′
[
(r + κ)Ct −
s2(αq¯1 + α¯q1)
α+ α¯
]
. (27)
The factor risk premium Λt is increasing in Ct and B, and is positive for Ct ≥ κC¯/(r + κ).
The presence of the flow portfolio as a priced factor can be viewed as a mispricing relative to
the CAPM in which the only factor is the market index. The factor risk premium Λt measures
the severity of the mispricing. If Λt > 0, then stocks covarying positively with the flow portfolio
are underpriced and earn abnormally high expected returns, while stocks covarying negatively are
overpriced and earn abnormally low returns.
20If the universe of assets includes more classes than only stocks, changes in Ct would affect the stock index.
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That the market CAPM does not price stocks correctly in our model is not surprising because
the index portfolio differs from the residual-supply portfolio. In fact, mispricing exists even when
delegation is costless. Indeed, setting Ct = C¯ = s = 0 in (27), we find that the factor risk premium
Λt is equal to rαα¯/(α + α¯). Since Λt > 0, stocks covarying positively with the flow portfolio are
underpriced, while stocks covarying negatively are overpriced. It is because of this mispricing that
the investor holds only the active fund under costless delegation.
Our main results concern not the existence of a mispricing per se, but the variation of the
mispricing with parameters characterizing the delegation of portfolio management. Corollary 1
confirms that mispricing becomes more severe (Λt increases) when Ct increases. The corollary
shows additionally that mispricing increases in B, the manager’s concern with commercial risk.
While the effect of Ct is through investor outflows from the active fund, the effect of B is through
the manager’s attempt to hedge against outflows. Hedging requires holding stocks that perform
well when outflows occur, i.e., when Ct increases. Such stocks are those covarying negatively with
the flow portfolio, e.g., because they are in small residual supply. The manager’s concern with
commercial risk adds to the demand for these stocks, exacerbating their overpricing, and lowering
their expected returns.21
We next turn to the comovement between stocks. Eqs. (12) and (21) imply that the covariance
matrix of returns is
Covt(dRt, dR
′
t) =
(
fΣ+ s2γ21Σp
′
fpfΣ
)
dt, (28)
where the first term in parentheses is the fundamental covariance, driven purely by asset cashflows,
and the second is the non-fundamental covariance, introduced by fund flows. The non-fundamental
covariance can be positive or negative, depending on how stocks covary with the flow portfolio.
Consider, for example, two stocks that are in large residual supply and covary positively with the
flow portfolio. Following outflows from the active fund, both stocks drop in price, and this generates
positive non-fundamental covariance. At the same time, the non-fundamental covariance between
these stocks and a third stock that is in small residual supply is negative because the latter stock’s
price increases following outflows.
We finally determine the autocorrelation of stock returns. As in the rest of our analysis, returns
are evaluated over an infinitesimal time period, and therefore concern a single point in time. We
21The manager has a hedging motive even when B = 0, but the sign is opposite that when B is large. Recall that
when B = 0, the manager cares about fund performance only through his personal investment in the fund. When Ct
is high, mispricing is severe and the fund has profitable investment opportunities. The manager can hedge against a
reduction in these opportunities by holding stocks that perform well when Ct decreases. This consideration plays an
important role in our analysis of momentum in Section 5.
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compute the covariance between the vector of returns at time t and the same vector at time t′ > t.
The diagonal elements of the autocovariance matrix correspond to the autocovariance of individual
stocks. The non-diagonal elements correspond to lead-lag effects, i.e., whether the past return of
one stock predicts the future return of another. Corollary 2 shows that the autocovariance matrix is
equal to the non-fundamental (contemporaneous) covariance times a negative scalar. The matrices
are proportional because they are both driven by fund flows, a point that we explain below in the
case of the autocovariance matrix.
Corollary 2 The covariance between stock returns at time t and those at time t′ > t is
Covt(dRt, dR
′
t′) = −s
2(r + κ)γ21e
−κ(t′−t)Σp′fpfΣ(dt)
2. (29)
A first implication of Corollary 2 is that stocks exhibit negative autocovariance, i.e., return
reversal. Consider, for example, a stock that is in large residual supply and covaries positively
with the flow portfolio. The stock’s return can be negative because of a negative cashflow shock
or because outflows from the active fund generate selling pressure. While cashflow shocks do not
affect future expected returns, outflows do, and they cause the stock’s expected return to rise. This
implies negative autocovariance.
A second implication of Corollary 2 is that lead-lag effects are negative for stock pairs whose
covariance with the flow portfolio has the same sign. Consider, for example, two stocks that are
in large residual supply and covary positively with the flow portfolio. A negative return of one
stock can be caused by cashflows or by outflows from the active fund. Cashflows generate no
predictability, but outflows cause the expected return of the other stock to rise. This implies a
negative lead-lag effect: a negative return of one stock predicts that the other stock will rise. The
negative return also predicts that stocks in small residual supply will drop, a positive lead-lag effect.
4 Asymmetric Information
We next assume that the investor does not observe the cost Ct, and must infer it from fund returns
and prices. The manager observes Ct because he observes the return of each stock, and therefore
knows the active fund’s gross return in addition to the net return.
We look for an equilibrium with the following characteristics. The investor’s conditional distri-
bution of Ct is normal with mean Cˆt. The variance of the conditional distribution is, in general, a
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deterministic function of time, but we focus on a steady state where it is constant.22 The investor’s
holdings of the active fund are
yt = b0 − b1Cˆt, (30)
where (b0, b1) are constants. Eq. (30) has the same form as under symmetric information, except
that Ct is replaced by its expectation Cˆt. Stock prices are
St =
F¯
r
+
Ft − F¯
r + κ
− (a0 + a1Cˆt + a2Ct), (31)
where (a0, a1, a2) are three constant vectors. Eq. (31) is more complicated than under symmetric
information because prices depend on both Cˆt and Ct: the investor’s expectation Cˆt determines
her active-fund holdings, and the true value Ct (known to the manager) forecasts the investor’s
future holdings. Under symmetric information, the effect of Ct depends on the covariance between
returns and the flow portfolio. We conjecture that the same is true under asymmetric information,
i.e., there exist constants (γ1, γ2) such that for i = 1, 2,
ai = γiΣp
′
f . (32)
We refer to an equilibrium satisfying (30) and (31) as linear.
4.1 Investor’s Inference
The investor updates her beliefs about the cost Ct using information on fund returns and prices. She
observes the share prices ztSt of the active fund and 1St of the index fund. These are informative
because Ct affects the vector of stock prices St. Stock prices, however, do not reveal Ct perfectly
because they also depend on the time-varying expected dividend Ft that the investor does not
observe.
In addition to prices, the investor observes the net-of-cost return of the active fund, ztdRt−Ctdt,
and the return of the index fund, 1dRt. Because the investor observes prices, she also observes
capital gains, and therefore can deduce net dividends (i.e., dividends minus Ct). Net dividends
are the incremental information that returns provide to the investor, and we use them instead of
returns when solving the investor’s inference problem.
22The steady state is reached in the limit when time t becomes large.
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In equilibrium, the active fund’s portfolio zt is equal to θ − xt1. Since the investor knows xt,
observing the price and net dividends of the index and active funds is informationally equivalent
to observing the price and net dividends of the index fund and of a hypothetical fund holding the
residual-supply portfolio θ. Therefore, we can take the investor’s information to be the net dividends
of the residual-supply portfolio θdDt−Ctdt, the dividends of the index fund 1dDt, the price of the
residual-supply portfolio θSt, and the price of the index fund 1St. We solve the investor’s inference
problem using recursive (Kalman) filtering.
Proposition 4 The mean Cˆt of the investor’s conditional distribution of Ct evolves according to
the process
dCˆt = κ(C¯−Cˆt)dt−β1
{
pf [dDt − Et(dDt)]− (Ct − Cˆt)dt
}
−β2pf
[
dSt + a1dCˆt − Et(dSt + a1dCˆt)
]
,
(33)
where
β1 ≡ sˆ
2
[
1− (r + k)
γ2∆
1Σ1′
]
1Σ1′
∆
, (34)
β2 ≡
s2γ2
φ2
(r+κ)2
+
s2γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
, (35)
and sˆ2 denotes the distribution’s steady-state variance. The variance sˆ2 is the unique positive
solution of the quadratic equation
sˆ4
[
1− (r + κ)
γ2∆
1Σ1′
]2
1Σ1′
∆
+ 2κsˆ2 −
s2φ2
(r+κ)2
φ2
(r+κ)2
+
s2γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
= 0. (36)
The term in β1 in (33) represents the investor’s learning from net dividends. The investor
lowers her estimate of the cost Ct if the active fund’s net dividends are above expectations. Of
course, net dividends can be high not only because Ct is low, but also because gross dividends are
high. The investor attempts to adjust for this by comparing with the dividends of the index fund.
The adjustment corresponds to the term 1Σθ
′
1Σ1′1, which enters (33) through the flow portfolio pf .
The term in β2 in (33) represents the investor’s learning from prices. The investor lowers her
estimate of Ct if the active fund’s price is above expectations. Indeed, the price could be high
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because the manager knows privately that Ct is low, and anticipates that the investor will increase
her participation in the fund, causing the price to rise, as she learns about Ct. As with dividends,
the investor needs to account for the fact that the price of the active fund can be high not only
because Ct is low, but also because the manager expects future dividends to be high (Ft small).
She attempts to adjust for this by comparing with the price of the index fund. The coefficient β2
measures the strength of learning from prices. Eq. (34) confirms that there is no learning from
prices (β2 = 0) if these do not reveal information about Ct (γ2 = 0), or if it is impossible to extract
this information because the variance of the expected dividend Ft is large (φ =∞).
Because the investor compares the performance of the active fund to that of the index fund,
she is effectively using the index as a benchmark. Note that benchmarking is not part of an explicit
contract tying the manager’s compensation to the index. Compensation is tied to the index only
implicitly: if the active fund outperforms the index, the investor infers that Ct is low and increases
her participation in the fund.
We next examine how an increase in a stock’s dividend or price affects Cˆt, the investor’s
expectation of Ct. Eq. (33) shows that Cˆt decreases if the stock receives positive weight in the
flow portfolio pf , and increases if the weight is negative.
23 Intuitively, stocks that receive positive
weight are those whose residual supply is large and whose weight in the active fund exceeds that in
the index. Good news about these stocks raise the performance of the active fund more than the
index, and reduce Cˆt. Conversely, good news about stocks that receive negative weight in the flow
portfolio raise Cˆt because the performance of the active fund rises less than the index.
Our analysis implies that a single portfolio—the flow portfolio—characterizes two distinct phe-
nomena: the investor’s flow into each stock in response to changes in her beliefs about the cost
(Section 3), and the informational flow from stock performance to investor beliefs about the cost
(Proposition 4). The dual role of the flow portfolio implies an amplification effect that is central
to our results. Suppose that a stock has a positive cashflow shock. If the stock is in large residual
supply (i.e., weight in the active fund exceeds that in the index), then the investor becomes more
optimistic about the active fund and increases her participation. The investor’s inflow, in turn,
generates demand for the stock and pushes its price up. Conversely, if the stock is in small residual
supply, then the investor reduces her participation in the active fund and migrates to the index
fund. The investor’s outflow again generates demand for the stock (because the stock’s index weight
exceeds its active weight) and pushes its price up. In both cases, cashflow shocks amplify their way
23The gradient of dCˆt with respect to dDt is −β1pf and with respect to dSt is −β2pf .
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to prices through fund inflows and outflows.
The intuition why the exact same portfolio characterizes asset flows and information flows is
as follows. Recall from Section 3 that the investor maintains a constant exposure to the index, and
therefore her flows between active and index fund constitute a portfolio with zero index beta. A
zero-beta portfolio also characterizes learning because the investor adjusts the performance of the
active fund by that of the index. The adjustment coefficient is derived by regressing the return
of the residual-supply portfolio on the index, and the residual of this regression is the return of a
zero-beta portfolio.
4.2 Optimization
The manager chooses controls (c¯t, y¯t, zt) to maximize the expected utility (4) subject to the budget
constraint (10), the normalization (7), and the investor’s holding policy (30). Since stock prices
depend on both Cˆt and Ct, the same is true for the manager’s value function. We conjecture that
the value function is
V¯ (Wt, Cˆt, Ct) ≡ − exp
[
−
(
rα¯Wt + q¯0 + (q¯1, q¯2)X¯t +
1
2
X¯ ′tQ¯X¯t
)]
, (37)
where X¯t ≡ (Cˆt, Ct)
′, (q¯0, q¯1, q¯2) are constants, and Q¯ is a constant symmetric 2× 2 matrix.
Proposition 5 The value function (37) satisfies the Bellman equation (14) if (q¯0, q¯1, q¯2, Q¯) satisfy
a system of six scalar equations.
The investor chooses controls (ct, xt, yt) to maximize the expected utility (3) subject to the
budget constraint (16) and the manager’s portfolio policy zt = θ − xt1. Unlike the manager, the
investor does not observe Ct, and so her value function depends only on (Wt, Cˆt). We conjecture
that the value function is
V (Wt, Ct) ≡ − exp
[
−
(
rαWt + q0 + q1Cˆt +
1
2
q11Cˆ
2
t
)]
, (38)
where (q0, q1, q11) are constants.
Proposition 6 The value function (38) satisfies the Bellman equation (18) if (q0, q1, q11) satisfy
a system of three scalar equations. The optimal control yt is linear in Cˆt.
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4.3 Equilibrium
Proposition 7 shows that the system of equations characterizing a linear equilibrium has a solution.
Proposition 7 There exists a linear equilibrium. The vectors (a1, a2) are given by (32), and the
constants (γ1, γ2) are positive.
Since γ1 > 0, an increase in the investor’s expectation of Ct lowers the prices of stocks that
covary positively with the flow portfolio and raises the prices of stocks covarying negatively. The
intuition is as with symmetric information: if the investor believes that Ct has increased, she reduces
her stake in the active fund and invests in the index fund. This amounts to selling a slice of the
flow portfolio, i.e., selling stocks in large residual supply and buying stocks in small residual supply.
The manager must take the other side of the transaction, and is induced to do so if stocks covarying
positively with the flow portfolio drop and stocks covarying negatively rise. Since γ2 > 0, the same
price movements occur when the increase concerns Ct instead of the expectation Cˆt. In that case,
the investor’s current stake in the active fund does not change, but prices move in anticipation of
the outflows that the investor will generate as she learns about Ct.
We next examine how the price response to Cˆt and Ct is reflected in expected returns. Corollary
3 shows that the same two factors (index and flow portfolio) that price stocks under symmetric
information do so also under asymmetric information.
Corollary 3 Stocks’ expected returns are given by
Et(dRt) =
rαα¯
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Covt(dRt,1dRt) + ΛtCovt(dRt, pfdRt), (39)
where
Λt ≡
rαα¯
α+ α¯
+
1
f + k∆
1Σ1′
[
g1Cˆt + g2Ct −
α(k1q¯1 + k2q¯2) + α¯k1q1
α+ α¯
]
, (40)
and the constants g1 > 0, g2 < 0, k > 0, k1 > 0 and k2 > 0, are defined by (B.8), (B.9), (B.15),
(B.16) and (B.17), respectively.
The factor risk premium Λt associated to the flow portfolio characterizes mispricing relative to
the market CAPM. Since g1 > 0, Λt increases in Cˆt, a result consistent with the price response.
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Indeed, consider a stock that is in large residual supply and covaries positively with the flow
portfolio. Following an increase in Cˆt, the investor sells the stock and the price drops. Corollary 3
implies that the stock’s expected return rises, a result consistent with the stock becoming cheaper
relative to fundamental value.
Consider next the effect of Ct holding Cˆt constant. Since g2 < 0, Λt decreases in Ct, a
result that seems at odds with the price response. Indeed, consider again a stock in large residual
supply. Following an increase in Ct, the price drops in anticipation of the investor’s future outflows.
But while the stock becomes cheaper relative to fundamental value, Corollary 3 implies that its
expected return declines. The explanation for the apparent inconsistency lies in the time-path of
the (instantaneous) expected return. While expected return declines in the short run, it rises in
the long run, as the outflows occur. It is the long-run rise in expected return that causes the price
to drop. The intuition for the short-run decline underlies our results on momentum and reversal,
and is deferred until Section 5.
We next turn to the comovement between stocks. Corollary 4 shows that the instantaneous
covariance matrix of returns resembles closely its symmetric-information counterpart (12). Both
matrices are the sum of fΣ, the fundamental covariance driven purely by asset cashflows, and a
scalar multiple of Σp′fpfΣ, the non-fundamental covariance introduced by fund flows.
Corollary 4 The covariance matrix of stock returns is
Covt(dRt, dR
′
t) =
(
fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ
)
dt. (41)
The resemblance between covariance matrices obscures an important qualitative difference.
Under symmetric information, fund flows depend only on the cost Ct, and are independent of cash-
flows. Cashflows thus affect only the fundamental covariance fΣ. Under asymmetric information,
fund flows depend on cashflows because the latter affect Cˆt. Comovement between cashflows and
fund flows is included in the non-fundamental covariance kΣp′fpfΣ. But while that matrix includes
cashflow effects, it is proportional to its symmetric-information counterpart s2γ21Σp
′
fpfΣ.
The explanation for the proportionality lies in the dual role of the flow portfolio. Consider two
stocks that are in large residual supply and covary positively with the flow portfolio. Both stocks
drop in price following outflows from the active fund—an event triggered by increases in Ct under
symmetric information, and in Cˆt under asymmetric information. The resulting positive covariance
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between the two stocks is driven purely by the price impact of fund flows. Asymmetric information
induces an additional positive covariance, between cashflows and fund flows. Because the two stocks
are in large residual supply, negative cashflow news of one stock trigger outflows from the active
fund, and this lowers the price of the other stock. Therefore, comovement between cashflows and
fund flows works in the same direction as that driven purely by fund flows. This explains why the
two types of comovement (which jointly constitute the non-fundamental covariance) are described
by proportional matrices.
Comparing the non-fundamental covariance under symmetric and asymmetric information
amounts to comparing the scalars multiplying the matrix Σp′fpfΣ. A natural conjecture is that
the non-fundamental covariance is larger under asymmetric information because in that case it
includes the covariance between cashflows and fund flows. A countervailing effect, however, is that
the covariance driven purely by fund flows is smaller under asymmetric information because the
investor’s expectation Cˆt varies less than the true value Ct. Nevertheless, Proposition 8 confirms
the conjecture.
Proposition 8 The non-fundamental covariance is larger under asymmetric than under symmetric
information (k > s2γ21).
Considering the diagonal terms of the covariance matrix yields the immediate corollary that
the volatility of individual stocks is larger under asymmetric information. This corollary is closely
related to the amplification effect described in Section 4.1: under asymmetric information, cashflow
shocks amplify their way to prices through fund flows, and this makes stocks more volatile.
Corollary 5 The volatility of individual stocks is larger under asymmetric than under symmetric
information.
We finally determine the autocorrelation of stock returns. As in the case of symmetric infor-
mation, the autocovariance matrix is equal to the non-fundamental covariance times a negative
scalar. Therefore, stocks exhibit return reversal, and lead-lag effects are negative for stock pairs
whose covariance with the flow portfolio has the same sign.
Corollary 6 The covariance between stock returns at time t and those at time t′ > t is
Covt(dRt, dR
′
t′) =
[
χ1e
−(κ+ρ)(t′−t) + χ2e
−κ(t′−t)
]
Σp′fpfΣ(dt)
2, (42)
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where the constants ρ > 0, χ1 < 0 and χ2 < 0 are defined by (B.10), (B.63) and (B.64), respectively.
While reversal also occurs under symmetric information, the underlying mechanisms are more
subtle when information is asymmetric. Consider a stock that is in large residual supply and
covaries positively with the flow portfolio. Under symmetric information, a negative return of the
stock has predictive power for subsequent returns when it is generated by outflows from the active
fund. Under asymmetric information, predictive power exists even when the return is generated
by a negative cashflow shock since this triggers outflows. Note that a negative return can also be
generated by the expectation of future outflows (i.e., increase in Ct rather than Cˆt). This, however,
yields the prediction that returns in the short run will be low, which is in the opposite direction
than in the two previous cases. Corollary 6 shows that the combined effects of cashflows and Cˆt
dominate that of Ct, and the autocovariance of individual stocks is negative at any horizon.
An additional implication of Corollary 6 concerns the rate at which the autocovariance decays
over time. Corollary 2 shows that the rate under symmetric information is κ, the mean-reversion
parameter of the cost Ct. Under asymmetric information, autocovariance decays at a mixture of the
rates κ and κ+ ρ. The latter rate characterizes the mean-reversion of the investor’s expectational
error Cˆt − Ct, and is larger than κ because of learning. Therefore, reversal occurs faster under
asymmetric information, a result consistent with the larger non-fundamental volatility of individual
stocks (Proposition 8).
5 Asymmetric Information and Gradual Adjustment
We next extend the analysis of asymmetric information to the case where the investor can adjust
only gradually her investment in the active fund. Gradual adjustment can result from contractual
restrictions or institutional decision lags.24 We model these frictions as a flow cost ψ(dyt/dt)
2/2
that the investor incurs when changing the number yt of active-fund shares that she owns.
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We look for an equilibrium with the following new features relative to Section 4. Since yt
cannot be set instantaneously to its optimal level, it becomes a state variable and affects prices.
24An example of contractual restrictions is lock-up periods, often imposed by hedge funds, which require investors
not to withdraw capital for a pre-specified time period. Institutional decision lags can arise for investors such as
pension funds, foundations or endowments, where decisions are made by boards of trustees that meet infrequently.
25The advantage of the quadratic cost over other formulations (such as an upper bound on |dyt/dt|) is that it
preserves the linearity of the model.
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Stock prices are
St =
F¯
r
+
Ft − F¯
r + κ
− (a0 + a1Cˆt + a2Ct + a3yt), (43)
where a0 is a constant vector and
ai = γiΣp
′
f , (44)
for constants (γ1, γ2, γ3) and i = 1, 2, 3. The investor’s speed of adjustment dyt/dt ≡ vt is
vt = b0 − b1Cˆt − b2yt, (45)
where (b0, b1, b2) are constants. We expect (b1, b2) to be positive, i.e., the investor reduces her
investment in the active fund faster when she estimates Ct to be large or when her investment is
large. We refer to an equilibrium satisfying (43) and (45) as linear. Inference in equilibrium is as
in Section 4.1, and Proposition 4 continues to hold.
5.1 Optimization
The manager chooses controls (c¯t, y¯t, zt) to maximize the expected utility (4) subject to the budget
constraint (10), the normalization (7), and the investor’s holding policy (45). Since stock prices
depend on (Cˆt, Ct, yt), the same is true for the manager’s value function. We conjecture that the
value function is
V¯ (Wt, Cˆt, Ct, yt) ≡ − exp
[
−
(
rα¯Wt + q¯0 + (q¯1, q¯2, q¯3)X¯t +
1
2
X¯ ′tQ¯X¯t
)]
, (46)
where X¯t ≡ (Cˆt, Ct, yt)
′, (q¯0, q¯1, q¯2, q¯3) are constants, and Q¯ is a constant symmetric 3× 3 matrix.
Proposition 9 The value function (37) satisfies the Bellman equation (14) if (q¯0, q¯1, q¯2, q¯3, Q¯)
satisfy a system of ten scalar equations.
The investor chooses controls (ct, xt, vt) to maximize the expected utility (3) subject to the
budget constraint (16) and the manager’s portfolio policy zt = θ−xt1. Under gradual adjustment,
it is convenient to solve the optimization problem in two steps. In a first step, we study optimization
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over (ct, xt), assuming that vt is given by (45). We solve this problem using dynamic programming,
and conjecture the value function
V (Wt, Ct, yt) ≡ − exp
[
−
(
rαWt + q0 + (q1, q2)Xt +
1
2
X ′tQXt
)]
, (47)
where Xt ≡ (Cˆt, yt), (q0, q1, q2) are constants, and Q is a constant symmetric 2 × 2 matrix. The
Bellman equation is
max
ct,xt
[− exp(−αct) +DV − βV ] = 0, (48)
where DV is the drift of the process V under the controls (ct, xt). The second step of the solution
method is to derive conditions under which the control vt given by (45) is optimal.
Proposition 10 The value function (47) satisfies the Bellman equation (48) if (q0, q1, q2, Q) satisfy
a system of six scalar equations. The control vt given by (45) is optimal if (b0, b1, b2) satisfy a system
of three scalar equations.
5.2 Equilibrium
Proposition 11 shows that the system of equations characterizing a linear equilibrium has a solution.
Proposition 11 There exists a linear equilibrium. The vectors (a1, a2, a3) are given by (44), the
constants (γ1, γ2) are positive and the constant γ3 is negative.
Since γ1 > 0, γ2 > 0 and γ3 < 0, an increase in Cˆt, an increase in Ct and a decrease in yt have
all the same effect: lower the prices of stocks that covary positively with the flow portfolio and raise
the prices of stocks covarying negatively. This is because in all three cases the investor moves out
of the active fund. A decrease in yt is a current outflow, while increases in Cˆt and Ct trigger future
outflows. An increase in Cˆt does not trigger an instant outflow because of the adjustment cost.
Corollary 7 shows that expected stock returns are determined by the covariance with the same
two factors (index and flow portfolio) as under instantaneous adjustment. The factor risk premium
Λt associated to the flow portfolio characterizes mispricing relative to the market CAPM. Examining
how Λt depends on Cˆt, Ct and yt allows us to trace the dynamic response of prices to shocks.
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Corollary 7 Stocks’ expected returns are given by
Et(dRt) =
rαα¯
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Covt(dRt,1dRt) + ΛtCovt(dRt, pfdRt), (49)
where
Λt ≡ rα¯+
1
f + k∆
1Σ1′
(
g˜1Cˆt + g2Ct + g3yt − k1q¯1 − k2q¯2
)
, (50)
and the constants g˜1 < 0, g2 < 0, g3 < 0, k > 0, k1 > 0 and k2 > 0, are defined by (C.2), (B.9),
(C.3), (B.15), (B.16) and (B.17), respectively.
Consider a stock that is in large residual supply and covaries positively with the flow portfolio.
Following an increase in Cˆt, the stock’s price drops instantly in anticipation of the investor’s future
outflows. But while the stock becomes cheap relative to fundamental value, its expected return
declines, meaning that underperformance is expected to continue. This follows from Corollary 7
because the factor risk premium Λt associated to the flow portfolio decreases in Cˆt (g˜1 < 0). As time
passes and outflows occur, the stock’s expected return rises, reflecting the stock’s cheapness relative
to fundamental value. This follows from Corollary 7 because outflows correspond to a decrease in
yt and therefore an increase in Λt (g3 < 0). The same pattern of momentum and reversal occurs
following an increase in Ct rather than Cˆt, because Λt decreases in Ct (g2 < 0).
Why is a price decline away from fundamental value followed by a decline in expected return?
And why is the manager willing to buy a stock that is expected to underperform? The intuition
is that the stock will eventually overperform and earn the manager a high expected return over a
long horizon. The manager could earn an even higher expected return by not holding the stock
during the period of expected underperformance and buying when that period ends. This, however,
presents a risk: the stock could overperform during that period, approaching again fundamental
value, in which case the manager would earn a low expected return. The manager can hedge against
that risk by buying the stock immediately, and it is this hedging demand that drives the price to
a level from which underperformance is expected to occur.
The hedging demand can be seen from the manager’s first-order condition. In the proof of
Proposition 9 we show that the first-order condition is
Et(dRt) = rα¯Covt(dRt, zˆtdRt) + f¯1(X¯t)Covt(dRt, dCˆt) + f¯2(X¯t)Covt(dRt, dCt), (51)
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where f¯1(X¯t) and f¯2(X¯t) are functions of X¯t ≡ (Cˆt, Ct, yt)
′. Eq. (51) requires that expected stock
returns compensate the manager for risk, determined by the contribution to the manager’s portfolio
variance (first term in the right-hand side), and by the covariances with Cˆt and Ct (second and
third terms in the right-hand side). The second and third terms correspond to the manager’s
hedging demand. Immediately following an increase in Cˆt, the first term does not change because
the investor cannot move instantly out of the active fund. The second and third terms, however,
decrease for a stock covarying positively with the flow portfolio. Indeed, when Cˆt is high, mispricing
is severe and the active fund has profitable investment opportunities. The manager can hedge
against a reduction in these opportunities by holding stocks that perform well when Cˆt or Ct
decrease, and these are stocks that covary positively with the flow portfolio.
Since shocks to Cˆt and Ct generate momentum and reversal, the autocorrelation of stock returns
should exhibit the same pattern. Corollary 8 shows that the autocorrelation is indeed positive for
short lags and negative for long lags. More generally, the autocovariance matrix of returns is
proportional to the non-fundamental covariance, with the proportionality coefficient being positive
for short lags and negative for long lags.
Corollary 8 The covariance between stock returns at time t and those at time t′ > t is
Covt(dRt, dR
′
t′) =
[
χ1e
−(κ+ρ)(t′−t) + χ2e
−κ(t′−t) + χ3e
−b2(t′−t)
]
Σp′fpfΣ(dt)
2, (52)
where the constants ρ > 0 and (χ1, χ2, χ3) are defined by (B.10), (C.45), (C.46) and (C.47),
respectively. The function χ(u) ≡ χ1e
−(κ+ρ)u + χ2e
−κu + χ3e
−b2u is positive when u is below a
threshold uˆ > 0 and is negative when u exceeds uˆ.
Corollary 8 has the additional implication that lead-lag effects change sign over time. Suppose
that a stock covarying positively with the flow portfolio earns a negative return, in which case
the active fund expects outflows. In anticipation of these outflows, stocks covarying positively
with the flow portfolio become cheap and stocks covarying negatively become expensive. Prices,
however, adjust only partially towards expected post-outflow levels because the manager prefers to
exploit current mispricings rather than betting that mispricings will become more attractive. As a
result, stocks covarying positively with the flow portfolio are expected to underperform in the short
run—a positive lead-lag effect—while stocks covarying negatively are expected to outperform—a
negative lead-lag effect. These effects reverse in the long run: stocks covarying positively with the
flow portfolio earn a high expected return, reflecting their cheapness relative to fundamental value,
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while stocks covarying negatively earn a low expected return. In summary, lead-lag effects for stock
pairs whose covariance with the flow portfolio has the same sign are positive in the short run and
negative in the long run, while the opposite holds when the signs are different.
Our theory predicts not only that momentum is followed by reversal, but also that the cumula-
tive effect is a reversal. Indeed, poor performance by the active fund generates momentum because
prices adjust only partially to reflect the ensuing outflows. But because an adjustment occurs and
prices move away from fundamental values, the expected return over a long horizon is a reversal.
Corollary 9 confirms that a stock’s return at time t is negatively correlated with the stock’s long-
horizon return. We define stocks’ long-horizon returns from time t on as limT→∞ e
−r(T−t)Rt,T ,
where Rt,T ≡
∫ T
t
dRt′e
r(T−t′) denotes cumulative returns between t and T > t.26
Corollary 9 The covariance between stock returns at time t and long-horizon returns from time t
on is
Covt
(
dRt, lim
T→∞
e−r(T−t)R′t,T
)
=
(∫ ∞
0
χ(u)e−rudu
)
Σp′fpfΣdt. (53)
Moreover,
∫∞
0 χ(u)e
−rudu < 0.
Our analysis so far focuses on the predictive power of past returns. Cashflow shocks have
no predictive power under symmetric information because they are independent of fund flows.
Under asymmetric information, however, cashflow shocks trigger fund flows and can therefore
predict returns. Cashflow shocks at time t are dividends dDt or innovations to expected dividends
dFt. Corollary 10 shows that the covariance matrix between either shock and returns at t
′ > t is
proportional to the non-fundamental covariance matrix, with the proportionality coefficient being
positive for short lags and negative for long lags. Therefore, cashflow shocks generate the same
type of predictability as returns.
Corollary 10 The covariance between cashflow shocks (dDt, dFt) at time t and returns at time
t′ > t is given by
Covt(dDt, dR
′
t′) =
β1(r + κ)Covt(dFt, dR
′
t′)
β2φ
=
[
χD1 e
−(κ+ρ)(t′−t) + χD2 e
−b2(t′−t)
]
Σp′fpfΣ(dt)
2, (54)
26Eq. (10) implies that the contribution of one share of stock n to the change in wealth between between t and T
is the nth component of the vector Rt,T .
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where the constants ρ > 0 and (χD1 , χ
D
2 ) are defined by (B.10) and (C.52)-(C.53), respectively. The
function χD(u) ≡ χD1 e
−(κ+ρ)u + χD2 e
−b2u is positive when u is below a threshold uˆD > 0 and is
negative when u exceeds uˆD.
5.3 Comparative Statics
We finally illustrate comparative statics of the model. The exogenous parameters are the interest
rate r, the diffusion matrix σ of the dividend process Dt, the relative size φ of shocks to expected
dividends Ft relative to current dividends Dt, the residual-supply portfolio θ, the risk aversion
α of the investor and α¯ of the manager, the mean-reversion κ and diffusion coefficient s of the
cost process Ct, and the coefficient ψ of the investor’s adjustment cost. We examine how these
parameters affect the extent of momentum and reversal, as measured by the autocovariance of stock
returns. From Corollary 8, the covariance between the return of stock n at time t and the return
at t′ > t is
Covt(dRnt, dRnt′) =
[
χ1e
−(κ+ρ)(t′−t) + χ2e
−κ(t′−t) + χ3e
−b2(t′−t)
]
(Σp′f )
2
n(dt)
2. (55)
An immediate implication of (55) is that momentum and reversal are stronger for stocks with large
idiosyncratic risk. Indeed, the covariance between such stocks and the flow portfolio is large in
absolute value (Lemma 1), and this corresponds to large (Σp′f )
2
n. We next examine how momentum
and reversal depend on market-wide parameters, entering through the function χ(u) ≡ χ1e
−(κ+ρ)u+
χ2e
−κu + χ3e
−b2u. This function characterizes the strength of momentum relative to reversal and
the lag at which momentum switches to reversal. While these characteristics could, in principle,
differ across stocks, they are identical in our model because χ(u) does not depend on n.
The function χ(u) depends only on a subset of exogenous parameters. Indeed, the matrix σ
and vector θ affect the system of equilibrium equations (and hence χ(u)) only through the scalar
∆/(1Σ1′) = θΣθ′ − (1Σθ′)2/(1Σ1′). This scalar is a measure of distance between the residual-
supply portfolio θ and the index portfolio 1, becoming zero when (θ,1) are collinear. Furthermore,
χ(u) depends on (α, α¯, ψ) only through (α¯/α, ψ/α). Therefore, we can set α = 1 without loss of
generality.27
27If (b1, b2, γ1, γ2, γ3, Q¯, Q) solve the system of equilibrium equations (C.22)-(C.24), (C.29), (C.30), (C.34) and
(C.39) for (α, α¯, ψ), then (αb1, b2, γ1, γ2, γ3/α, D¯αQ¯D¯α,DQD) solve the same equations for (1, α¯/α, ψ/α), where D¯α
is a diagonal 3 × 3 matrix with elements (1, 1, 1/α) and D is a diagonal 2 × 2 matrix with elements (1, 1/α). The
constants (ρ, χ1, χ2, χ3) remain the same because of (B.10) and (C.45)-(C.47).
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Figure 1: The left panel plots the function χ(u) that characterizes the autocovariance of returns.
The right panel plots the function χy(u) that characterizes the covariance between lagged returns
and the investor’s position in the active fund. The lag u in the x-axis takes values from zero to five
years. Parameter values are for the base case.
We perform comparative statics relative to the following base case. The interest rate r is
4%. The mean-reversion κ is 30%, implying that shocks to Ct have a half-life of 2.31 years.
The risk aversion of the manager is ten, i.e., ten times that of the investor. The coefficients
(ψ, φ2,∆/(1Σ1′), s2) are (0.15, 0.1, 0.1, 0.8). The left panel of Figure 1 plots χ(u) for the base case.
Consistent with Corollary 8, momentum appears for short lags (up to four months in the figure) and
reversal for long lags. Cumulative momentum is weaker than cumulative reversal, consistent with
Corollary 9. But while momentum is weaker cumulatively, it generates the largest predictability
per unit time. Indeed, the largest autocovariance in absolute value (i.e., largest |χ(u)|) corresponds
to momentum and is for very short lags.28
The right panel of Figure 1 concerns the covariance between the return of stock n at time t
and the investor’s position in the active fund at t′ > t. Extending the proof of Corollary 8, we can
show that
Covt(dRnt, yt′) =
[
χY1 e
−(κ+ρ)(t′−t) + χY2 e
−κ(t′−t) + χY3 e
−b2(t′−t)
]
(Σp′f )ndt,
for constants (χY1 , χ
Y
2 , χ
Y
3 ). The function χ
Y (u) ≡ χY1 e
−(κ+ρ)u + χY2 e
−κu + χY3 e
−b2u is positive,
consistent with the result that high returns of stocks covarying positively with the flow portfolio
((Σp′f )n > 0) trigger an increase in the investor’s position in the active fund. The right panel of
Figure 1 plots χY (u) for the base case. Following a return shock, the investor adjusts her position
28Corollary 8 understates the extent of momentum because it concerns the conditional autocovariance (where
conditioning is on the state vector X¯t). The unconditional autocovariance is derived from its conditional counterpart
by adding the autocovariance of expected returns. Since the latter is positive, unconditional momentum is stronger
and unconditional reversal is weaker than their conditional counterparts.
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Figure 2: Comparative statics of momentum and reversal. The left panel considers variation in the
manager’s risk-aversion α¯ from α¯ = 10 (base case, solid line) to α¯ = 4 (dashed line). The right panel
considers variation in the coefficient ψ of the investor’s adjustment cost from ψ = 0.15 (base case,
solid line) to ψ = 0.3.
fully within twelve months, with the bulk of the adjustment taking place within the first six months.
Figure 2 illustrates comparative statics. The left panel examines how momentum and reversal
depend on the manager’s risk aversion α¯. When the manager is more risk-averse, he requires a larger
price inducement to take the other side of transactions initiated by the investor. Therefore, the
non-fundamental price volatility that these transactions generate increases, and amplification effects
become stronger.29 Since momentum and reversal are the result of non-fundamental volatility, they
also increase. More subtly, momentum increases relative to reversal. The intuition is that in a
reversal phase the manager has acquired a position from the investor, and requires an abnormal
return as compensation for fundamental risk that he bears. By contrast, in a momentum phase the
manager expects to acquire a position in the future. An abnormal return then arises because of
the uncertainty that the transaction might not materialize and prices revert back to fundamentals.
When the manager is more risk averse, the investor’s transactions generate larger volatility, and
therefore the relevant uncertainty in a momentum phase increases relative to that in a reversal
phase.
Comparative statics with respect to the diffusion coefficient s of the cost process Ct resemble
those with respect to α¯: when s is larger, non-fundamental volatility is larger, momentum and
reversal increase, and momentum increases relative to reversal. The intuition is that when the
investor expects Ct to be more variable, she generates larger fund flows, and this increases non-
fundamental price volatility.
29The increase in non-fundamental volatility can be seen from the scalar coefficient k multiplying the non-
fundamental covariance matrix (Corollary 4). This coefficient increases from 51.0 for α¯ = 4 to 137.7 for α¯ = 10.
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The right panel of Figure 2 examines how momentum and reversal depend on the adjustment-
cost coefficient ψ. When ψ is small, momentum is limited to shorter lags. Somewhat surprisingly,
however, momentum increases. The intuition is that when the investor can adjust more easily her
position in the active fund, she generates larger flows, and this increases non-fundamental price
volatility.30
30The scalar coefficient k multiplying the non-fundamental covariance matrix increases from 106.9 for ψ = 0.3 to
137.7 for ψ = 0.15.
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Appendix
A Symmetric Information
Proof of Proposition 1: Eqs. (5), (9), (10) and (11) imply that
d
(
rα¯Wt + q¯0 + q¯1Ct +
1
2
q¯11C
2
t
)
= G¯dt+rα¯zˆtσ
(
dBDt +
φdBFt
r + κ
)
−s (rα¯zˆta1 − q¯1 − q¯11Ct) dBCt,
(A.1)
where
G¯ ≡rα¯
{
rWt + zˆt
[
ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1C¯
]
+B(b0 − b1Ct)− c¯t
}
+ q¯1κ(C¯ − Ct) +
1
2
q¯11
[
2κCt(C¯ − Ct) + s
2
]
.
Eqs. (13) and (A.1) imply that
DV¯ = −V¯
[
G¯−
1
2
(rα¯)2f zˆtΣzˆ
′
t −
1
2
s2 (rα¯zˆta1 − q¯1 − q¯11Ct)
2
]
. (A.2)
Substituting (A.2) into (14), we can write the first-order conditions with respect to c¯t and zˆt as
α¯ exp(−α¯c¯t) + rα¯V¯ = 0, (A.3)
h¯(Ct) = rα¯(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)zˆ
′
t, (A.4)
respectively, where
h¯(Ct) ≡ ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1C¯ + s
2a1(q¯1 + q¯11Ct). (A.5)
Eq. (A.4) is equivalent to (15) because of (5), (11) and (12). Using (A.2) and (A.3), we can simplify
(14) to
G¯−
1
2
(rα¯)2zˆt(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)zˆ
′
t + rα¯s
2zˆta1(q¯1 + q¯11Ct)−
1
2
s2(q¯1 + q¯11Ct)
2 + β − r = 0. (A.6)
Eqs. (A.3) and (13) imply that
c¯t = rWt +
1
α¯
[
q¯0 + q¯1Ct +
1
2
q¯11C
2
t − log(r)
]
. (A.7)
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Substituting (A.7) into (A.6) the terms in Wt cancel, and we are left with
rα¯zˆt
[
ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1C¯
]
+ rα¯B(b0 − b1Ct)− r
(
q¯0 + q¯1Ct +
1
2
q¯11C
2
t
)
+ q¯1κ(C¯ − Ct) +
1
2
q¯11
[
2κCt(C¯ − Ct) + s
2
]
+ β − r + r log(r)
−
1
2
(rα¯)2zˆt(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)zˆ
′
t + rα¯s
2zˆta1(q¯1 + q¯11Ct)−
1
2
s2(q¯1 + q¯11Ct)
2 = 0. (A.8)
The terms in (A.8) that involve zˆt can be written as
rα¯zˆt
[
ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1C¯
]
−
1
2
(rα¯)2zˆt(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)zˆ
′
t + rα¯s
2zˆta1(q¯1 + q¯11Ct)
= rα¯zˆth¯(Ct)−
1
2
(rα¯)2zˆt(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)zˆ
′
t
=
1
2
rα¯zˆth¯(Ct)
=
1
2
h¯(Ct)
′(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)
−1h¯(Ct), (A.9)
where the first step follows from (A.5) and the last two from (A.4). Substituting (A.9) into (A.8),
we find
1
2
h¯(Ct)
′(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)
−1h¯(Ct) + rα¯B(b0 − b1Ct)− r
(
q¯0 + q¯1Ct +
1
2
q¯11C
2
t
)
+ q¯1κ(C¯ − Ct) +
1
2
q¯11
[
2κCt(C¯ − Ct) + s
2
]
+ β − r + r log(r)−
1
2
s2(q¯1 + q¯11Ct)
2 = 0.
(A.10)
Eq. (A.10) is quadratic in Ct. Identifying terms in C
2
t , Ct, and constants, yields three scalar
equations in (q¯0, q¯1, q¯11).
Proof of Proposition 2: Eqs. (5), (11) and (16) imply that
d
(
rαWt + q0 + q1Ct +
1
2
q11C
2
t
)
=Gdt+ rα(xt1+ ytzt)σ
(
dBDt +
φdBFt
r + κ
)
− s [rα(xt1+ ytzt)a1 − q1 − q11Ct] dBCt, (A.11)
where
G ≡rα
{
rWt + (xt1+ ytzt)
[
ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1C¯
]
− ytCt − ct
}
+ q1κ(C¯ − Ct) +
1
2
q11
[
2κCt(C¯ − Ct) + s
2
]
.
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Eqs. (17) and (A.11) imply that
DV = −V
{
G−
1
2
(rα)2f(xt1+ ytzt)Σ(xt1+ ytzt)
′ −
1
2
s2 [rα(xt1+ ytzt)a1 − q1 − q11Ct]
2
}
.
(A.12)
Substituting (A.12) into (18), we can write the first-order conditions with respect to ct, xt and yt
as
α exp(−αct) + rαV = 0, (A.13)
1h(Ct) = rα1(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)(xt1+ ytzt)
′, (A.14)
zth(Ct)− Ct = rαzt(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)(xt1+ ytzt)
′, (A.15)
respectively, where
h(Ct) ≡ ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1C¯ + s
2a1(q1 + q11Ct). (A.16)
Eqs. (A.14) and (A.15) are equivalent to (19) and (20) because of (5), (11) and (12). Solving for
ct, and proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can simplify (18) to
rα(xt1+ ytzt)
[
ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1C¯
]
− rαytCt − r
(
q0 + q1Ct +
1
2
q11C
2
t
)
+ q1κ(C¯ − Ct) +
1
2
q11
[
2κCt(C¯ − Ct) + s
2
]
+ β − r + r log(r)
−
1
2
(rα)2(xt1+ ytzt)(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)(xt1+ ytzt)
′
+ rαs2(xt1+ ytzt)a1(q1 + q11Ct)−
1
2
s2(q1 + q11Ct)
2 = 0. (A.17)
Eq. (A.17) is the counterpart of (A.8) for the investor. The terms in (A.17) that involve (xt, yt)
can be written as
rα(xt1+ ytzt)
[
ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1C¯
]
− rαytCt
−
1
2
(rα)2(xt1+ ytzt)(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)(xt1+ ytzt)
′ + rαs2(xt1+ ytzt)a1(q1 + q11Ct)
= rα(xt1+ ytzt)h(Ct)− rαytCt −
1
2
(rα)2(xt1+ ytzt)(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)(xt1+ ytzt)
′
=
1
2
rα(xt1+ ytzt)h(Ct)−
1
2
rαytCt, (A.18)
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where the first step follows from (A.16) and the second from
(xt1+ ytzt)h(Ct)− ytCt = rα(xt1+ ytzt)(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)(xt1+ ytzt)
′, (A.19)
which in turn follows by multiplying (A.14) by xt, (A.15) by yt, and adding up. To eliminate xt
and yt in (A.18), we use (A.14) and (A.15). Noting that in equilibrium zt = θ − xt1, we can write
(A.14) as
1h(Ct) = rα1(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1) [xt1+ yt(θ − xt1)]
′ . (A.20)
Multiplying (A.14) by xt and adding to (A.15), we similarly find
θh(Ct)− Ct = rαθ(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1) [xt1+ yt(θ − xt1)]
′ . (A.21)
Eqs. (A.20) and (A.21) form a linear system in xt(1− yt) and yt. Solving the system, we find
xt(1− yt) =
1
rαD
{
1h(Ct)θ(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)θ
′ − [θh(Ct)− Ct]1(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)θ
′
}
, (A.22)
yt =
1
rαD
{
[θh(Ct)− Ct] 1(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)1
′ − 1h(Ct)1(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)θ
′
}
, (A.23)
where
D ≡ θ(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)θ
′1(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)1
′ −
[
1(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)θ
′
]2
.
Eq. (A.23) implies that the optimal control yt is linear in Ct. Using (A.22) and (A.23), we can
write (A.18) as
1
2
rα(xt1+ ytzt)h(Ct)−
1
2
rαytCt −
1
2
s2(q1 + q11Ct)
2
=
1
2
rα [xt1+ yt(θ − xt1)] h(Ct)−
1
2
rαytCt −
1
2
s2(q1 + q11Ct)
2
=
1
2D
{
[1h(Ct)]
2 θ(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)θ
′ − 2 [θh(Ct)− Ct]1h(Ct)1(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)θ
′
+ [θh(Ct)− Ct]
2 1(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)1
′
}
−
1
2
s2(q1 + q11Ct)
2. (A.24)
Substituting (A.24) into (A.17), we find
1
2D
{
[1h(Ct)]
2 θ(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)θ
′ − 2 [θh(Ct)− Ct] 1h(Ct)1(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)θ
′
+ [θh(Ct)− Ct]
2 1(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)1
′
}
− r
(
q0 + q1Ct +
1
2
q11C
2
t
)
+ q1κ(C¯ − Ct) +
1
2
q11
[
2κCt(C¯ − Ct) + s
2
]
+ β − r + r log(r)−
1
2
s2(q1 + q11Ct)
2 = 0.
(A.25)
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Eq. (A.25) is quadratic in Ct. Identifying terms in C
2
t , Ct, and constants, yields three scalar
equations in (q0, q1, q11).
Proof of Proposition 3: We first impose market clearing and derive the constants (a0, a1, b0, b1, γ1)
as functions of (q¯1, q¯11, q1, q11). Setting zt = θ − xt1 and y¯t = 1− yt, we can write (A.4) as
h¯(Ct) = rα¯(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)(1− yt)(θ − xt1)
′. (A.26)
Premultiplying (A.26) by 1, dividing by rα¯, and adding to (A.20) divided by rα, we find
1
[
h(Ct)
rα
+
h¯(Ct)
rα¯
]
= 1(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)θ
′. (A.27)
Eq. (A.27) is linear in Ct. Identifying terms in Ct, we find
(
r + κ+ s2q11
rα
+
r + κ+ s2q¯11
rα¯
)
1a1 = 0⇒ 1a1 = 0. (A.28)
Identifying constant terms, and using (A.28), we find
( r
rα
+
r
rα¯
)
1a0 = g1Σθ
′ ⇒ 1a0 =
αα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′. (A.29)
Substituting (A.28) and (A.29) into (A.20), we find
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′ = rαg1Σ [xt1+ yt(θ − xt1)]
′ ⇒ xt =
α¯
α+α¯ − yt
1− yt
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
. (A.30)
Substituting (A.30) into (A.26), we find
h¯(Ct) = rα¯(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)
[
α
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
1+ (1− yt)pf
]′
= rα¯(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)
[
α
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
1+ (1− b0 + b1Ct)pf
]′
, (A.31)
where the second step follows from (9). Eq. (A.31) is linear in Ct. Identifying terms in Ct, we find
(r + κ+ s2q¯11)a1 = rα¯b1
(
fΣp′f + s
2a′1p
′
fa1
)
. (A.32)
Therefore, a1 is collinear to the vector Σp
′
f , as in (21). Substituting (21) into (A.32), we find
(r + κ+ s2q¯11)γ1 = rα¯b1
(
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
)
. (A.33)
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Identifying constant terms in (A.31), and using (21), we find
a0 =
αα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Σ1′ +
[
γ1(κC¯ − s
2q¯1)
r
+ α¯(1 − b0)
(
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
)]
Σp′f . (A.34)
Premultiplying (A.26) by θ, dividing by rα¯, and adding to (A.21) divided by rα, we find
θ
[
h(Ct)
rα
+
h¯(Ct)
rα¯
]
−
Ct
rα
= θ(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)θ
′. (A.35)
Eq. (A.35) is linear in Ct. Identifying terms in Ct, we find
(
r + κ+ s2q11
rα
+
r + κ+ s2q¯11
rα¯
)
θa1 =
1
rα
. (A.36)
Substituting (21) into (A.36), we find
(
r + κ+ s2q11
rα
+
r + κ+ s2q¯11
rα¯
)
γ1∆
1Σ1′
=
1
rα
. (A.37)
Identifying constant terms in (A.35), we find
( r
rα
+
r
rα¯
)
θa0 −
(
κC¯ − s2q1
rα
+
κC¯ − s2q¯1
rα¯
)
θa1 = θ(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)θ
′. (A.38)
Using (21) and (A.34), we can write (A.38) as
b0 =
α¯
α+ α¯
+
s2γ1(q1 − q¯1)
r(α+ α¯)
(
f +
s2γ2
1
∆
1Σ1′
) . (A.39)
Substituting b0 from (A.39) into (A.34), we find
a0 =
αα¯f
α+ α¯
Σθ′ + γ1
[
κC¯
r
−
s2(αq¯1 + α¯q1)
r(α+ α¯)
+
αα¯s2γ1∆
(α+ α¯)1Σ1′
]
Σp′f . (A.40)
The system of equations characterizing equilibrium is as follows. The endogenous variables are
(a0, a1, b0, b1, γ1, q¯0, q¯1, q¯11, q0, q1, q11). The equations linking them are (21), (A.33), (A.37), (A.39),
(A.40), the three equations derived from (A.10) by identifying terms in C2t , Ct, and constants,
and the three equations derived from (A.25) through the same procedure. To simplify the system,
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we note that the variables (q¯0, q0) enter only in the equations derived from (A.10) and (A.25) by
identifying constants. Therefore they can be determined separately, and we need to consider only
the equations derived from (A.10) and (A.25) by identifying linear and quadratic terms. We next
simplify these equations, using implications of market clearing.
Using (21) and (A.33), we can write (A.31) as
h¯(Ct) =
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Σ1′ + h¯1(Ct)Σp
′
f , (A.41)
where
h¯1(Ct) ≡
rαα¯
(
f +
s2γ2
1
∆
1Σ1′
)
α+ α¯
+
α¯s2γ1(q¯1 − q1)
α+ α¯
+ rα¯b1
(
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
)
Ct.
Eq. (21) implies that
(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)1
′ = fΣ1′ ⇒ 1Σ(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)
−1 =
1
f
, (A.42)
(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)p
′
f =
(
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
)
Σp′f ⇒ pfΣ(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)
−1 =
pf
f + k∆
1Σ1′
. (A.43)
Using (A.41)-(A.43), we find
1
2
h¯(Ct)
′(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)
−1h¯(Ct) =
r2α2α¯2f(1Σθ′)2
2(α+ α¯)21Σ1′
+
h¯1(Ct)
2 ∆
1Σ1′
2
(
f +
s2γ2
1
∆
1Σ1′
) . (A.44)
We next substitute (A.44) into (A.10), and identify terms. Identifying terms in C2t , we find
(r + 2κ)q¯11 + s
2q¯211 − r
2α¯2b21
(
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
)
∆
1Σ1′
= 0. (A.45)
Identifying terms in Ct, we find
(r+κ)q¯1+s
2q¯1q¯11−rα¯b1

rαα¯
(
f +
s2γ2
1
∆
1Σ1′
)
α+ α¯
+
α¯s2γ1(q¯1 − q1)
α+ α¯

 ∆
1Σ1′
−κC¯q¯11+rα¯Bb1 = 0. (A.46)
Substituting h¯(Ct) from (A.41) into (A.27), and using (21), we find
1h(Ct) =
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′. (A.47)
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Following the same procedure for (A.35) instead of (A.27), we find
θh(Ct)− Ct =
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
(1Σθ′)2
1Σ1′
+
[
rα
(
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
)
−
α
α¯
h¯1(Ct)
]
∆
1Σ1′
(A.48)
Eq. (21) implies that the denominator D in (A.25) is
D = f∆
(
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
)
. (A.49)
Using (21) and (A.47)-(A.49), we find that the equation derived from (A.25) by identifying terms
in C2t is
(r + 2κ)q11 + s
2q211 − r
2α2b21
(
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
)
∆
1Σ1′
= 0, (A.50)
and that derived by identifying terms in Ct is
(r + κ)q1 + s
2q1q11 + rαb1

rαα¯
(
f +
s2γ2
1
∆
1Σ1′
)
α+ α¯
+
αs2γ1(q1 − q¯1)
α+ α¯

 ∆
1Σ1′
− κC¯q11 = 0. (A.51)
Solving for equilibrium amounts to solving the system of (21), (A.33), (A.37), (A.39), (A.40),
(A.45), (A.46), (A.50) and (A.51) in the unknowns (a0, a1, b0, b1, γ1, q¯1, q¯11, q1, q11). This reduces
to solving the system of (A.33), (A.37), (A.45) and (A.50) in the unknowns (b1, γ1, q¯11, q11): given
(b1, γ1, q¯11, q11), a1 can be determined from (21), (q¯1, q1) from the linear system of (A.46) and
(A.51), and (a0, b0) from (A.40) and (A.39). Replacing the unknown b1 by
bˆ1 ≡ rα¯b1
√
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
,
we can write the latter system as
(r + κ+ s2q¯11)γ1 = bˆ1
√
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
, (A.52)
(
r + κ+ s2q11
rα
+
r + κ+ s2q¯11
rα¯
)
γ1∆
1Σ1′
=
1
rα
, (A.53)
(r + 2κ)q¯11 + s
2q¯211 −
bˆ21∆
1Σ1′
= 0, (A.54)
(r + 2κ)q11 + s
2q211 −
α2bˆ21∆
α¯21Σ1′
= 0. (A.55)
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Eq. (A.54) is quadratic in q¯11 and has a unique positive solution. Likewise, (A.55) is quadratic in
q11 and has a unique positive solution. In both cases, the solution is increasing in bˆ1, is equal to
zero for bˆ1 = 0, and to ∞ for bˆ1 =∞. Treating (q¯11, q11) as implicit functions of bˆ1, we next reduce
the system of (A.52)-(A.55) to that of (A.52) and (A.53) in the unknowns (bˆ1, γ1). Since (q¯11, q11)
are increasing in bˆ1, (A.53) has a unique solution bˆ1 > 0 for γ1 ∈ (0, γ¯1), where γ¯1 ≡
α¯1Σ1′
(α+α¯)∆(r+κ) .
This solution is decreasing in γ1, is equal to ∞ for γ1 = 0, and to zero for γ1 = γ¯1. Treating bˆ1
as implicit function of γ1, we next reduce the system of (A.52) and (A.53) to the single equation
(A.53) in the unknown γ1. Using (A.54), we can write this equation as
γ21
f +
s2γ2
1
∆
1Σ1′
=
[
(r + 2κ)q¯11 + s
2q¯211
]
1Σ1′
(r + κ+ s2q¯11)2∆
. (A.56)
The left-hand side of (A.56) is increasing in γ1, is equal to zero for γ1 = 0, and to a positive value
for γ1 = γ¯1. The right-hand side of (A.56) is increasing in q¯11, and therefore decreasing in γ1. It is
equal to a positive value for γ1 = 0 and to zero for γ1 = γ¯1. Therefore, (A.56) has a unique positive
solution γ1, and there exists a unique linear equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1: Denoting by β the regression coefficient of dRt on 1dRt, we have
Covt(dRt, pfdRt) = Covt (dRt − β1dRt, pfdRt)
= Covt (dǫt, pfdRt)
= Covt [dǫt, pf (dRt − β1dRt)]
= Covt (dǫt, pfdǫt) ,
where the first step follows because the index and the flow portfolio are independent (see Footnote
16), the second and fourth steps follow from the definition of dǫt, and the third step follows because
dǫt is independent of 1dRt.
Proof of Corollary 1: Stocks’ expected returns are
Et(dRt) =
[
ra0 + (r + κ)a1Ct − κa1C¯
]
dt
=

 rαα¯fα+ α¯ 1Σθ
′
1Σ1′
Σ1′ +

(r + κ)γ1Ct − s2γ1(αq¯1 + α¯q1)
α+ α¯
+
rαα¯
(
f +
s2γ2
1
∆
1Σ1′
)
α+ α¯

Σp′f

 dt,
(A.57)
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where the first step follows from (11), and the second from (21), (22) and (A.40). Using (A.42)
and (A.43), we can write (A.57) as
Et(dRt) =
[
rαα¯
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
(fΣ+ s2a1a
′
1)1
′ + Λt(fΣ+ s
2a1a
′
1)p
′
f
]
dt. (A.58)
Eq. (A.58) is equivalent to (26) because of (12).
The factor risk premium Λt is increasing in Ct because γ1 > 0. To show that Λt is increasing
in B, we compute (q¯1, q1), solving the linear system of (A.46) and (A.51). The system yields
αq¯1 + α¯q1 =
Y0 + Y1κC¯ − Y2B
Z
, (A.59)
where
Y0 ≡
r2α2α¯2s2b1
(
f +
s2γ2
1
∆
1Σ1′
)
∆
(α+ α¯)1Σ1′
[
q11 − q¯11 +
r(α+ α¯)b1γ1∆
1Σ1′
]
,
Y1 ≡ αq¯11
(
r + κ+ s2q11 +
rαs2b1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
+ α¯q11
(
r + κ+ s2q¯11 −
rα¯s2b1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
,
Y2 ≡ rαα¯b1
(
r + κ+ s2q11 +
rα2s2b1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
,
Z ≡ (r + κ+ s2q¯11)(r + κ+ s
2q11) +
rα2s2b1γ1∆(r + κ+ s
2q¯11)
(α+ α¯)1Σ1′
−
rα¯2s2b1γ1∆(r + κ+ s
2q11)
(α+ α¯)1Σ1′
.
Using (A.33) and the positivity of (b1, γ1, q¯11, q11), we find Y2 > 0 and Z > 0. Therefore, Λt is
increasing in B. Moreover, Λt > 0 if this holds for B = 0. Eqs. (27) and (A.59) imply that Λt > 0
for B = 0 if
rαα¯
α+ α¯
(
f +
s2γ21∆
1Σ1′
)
+ γ1(r + κ)Ct −
s2γ1(Y0 + Y1κC¯)
(α+ α¯)Z
> 0. (A.60)
Using (A.33) and the positivity of (b1, γ1, q¯11, q11), we find
rαα¯s2γ21∆
(α+ α¯)1Σ1′
>
s2γ1Y0
(α+ α¯)Z
,
γ1 >
s2γ1Y1
(α+ α¯)Z
.
Therefore, (A.60) holds for Ct ≥ κC¯/(r + κ).
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Proof of Corollary 2: The autocovariance matrix is
Covt(dRt, dR
′
t′)
= Covt
{
σ
(
dBDt +
φdBFt
r + κ
)
− sa1dBCt,
[
(r + κ)a1Ct′dt + σ
(
dBDt′ +
φdBFt′
r + κ
)
− sa1dBCt′
]′}
= Covt
[
σ
(
dBDt +
φdBFt
r + κ
)
− sa1dBCt, (r + κ)a
′
1Ct′dt
]
= Covt
[
−sa1dBCt, (r + κ)a
′
1Ct′dt
]
= −s(r + κ)γ21Covt (dBCt, Ct′) Σpfp
′
fΣdt, (A.61)
where the first step follows by using (11) and omitting quantities known at time t, the second step
follows because the increments (dBDt′ , dB
F
t′ , dB
C
t′ ) are independent of information up to time t
′, the
third step follows because BCt is independent of (B
D
t , B
F
t ), and the fourth step follows from (21).
Eq. (5) implies that
Ct′ = e
−κ(t′−t)Ct +
[
1− e−κ(t
′−t)
]
C¯ + s
∫ t′
t
e−κ(t
′−u)dBCu. (A.62)
Substituting (A.62) into (A.61), we find (29).
B Asymmetric Information
Proof of Proposition 4: We use Theorem 10.3 of Liptser and Shiryaev (LS 2000). The investor
learns about Ct, which follows the process (5). She observes the following information:
• The net dividends of the residual-supply portfolio θDt−Ctdt. This corresponds to the process
ξ1t ≡ θDt −
∫ t
0 Csds.
• The dividends of the index fund 1dDt. This corresponds to the process ξ2t ≡ 1Dt.
• The price of the residual-supply portfolio θSt. Given the conjecture (31) for stock prices, this
is equivalent to observing the process ξ3t ≡ θ(St + a1Cˆt).
• The price of the index portfolio 1St. This is equivalent to observing the process ξ4t ≡
1(St + a1Cˆt).
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The dynamics of ξ1t are
dξ1t = θ(Ftdt+ σdB
D
t )− Ctdt
=
[
(r + κ)θa0 −
κθF¯
r
+ (r + κ)ξ3t + (r + κ)θa2Ct − Ct
]
dt+ θσdBDt
=
[
(r + κ)θa0 −
κθF¯
r
+ (r + κ)ξ3t −
(
1−
(r + κ)γ2∆
1Σ1′
)
Ct
]
dt + θσdBDt , (B.1)
where the first step follows from (1), the second from (31), and the third from (32). Likewise, the
dynamics of ξ2t are
dξ2t =
[
(r + κ)1a0 −
κ1F¯
r
+ (r + κ)ξ4t
]
dt + 1σdBDt . (B.2)
The dynamics of ξ3t are
dξ3t = d
{
θ
[
F¯
r
+
Ft − F¯
r + κ
− (a0 + a2Ct)
]}
= θ
[
κ(F¯ − Ft)dt + φσdB
F
t
r + κ
− a2
[
κ(C¯ − Ct)dt+ sdB
C
t
]]
= κ
[
θ
(
F¯
r
− a0 − a2C¯
)
− ξ3t
]
dt+
φθσdBFt
r + κ
− sθa2dB
C
t
= κ
(
θF¯
r
− θa0 −
γ2∆C¯
1Σ1′
− ξ3t
)
dt+
φθσdBFt
r + κ
−
sγ2∆dB
C
t
1Σ1′
, (B.3)
where the first step follows from (31), the second from (2) and (5), and the fourth from (32).
Likewise, the dynamics of ξ4t are
dξ4t = κ
(
1F¯
r
− 1a0 − ξ4t
)
dt+
φ1σdBFt
r + κ
. (B.4)
The dynamics (5) and (B.1)-(B.4) map into the dynamics (10.62) and (10.63) of LS by setting
θt ≡ Ct, ξt ≡ (ξ1t, ξ2t, ξ3t, ξ4t)
′, W1t ≡
(
BDt
BFt
)
, W2t ≡ B
C
t , a0(t) ≡ κC¯, a1(t) ≡ −κ, a2(t) ≡ 0,
b1(t) ≡ 0, b2(t) ≡ s, γt ≡ sˆ
2,
A0(t) ≡


(r + κ)θa0 −
κθF¯
r
(r + κ)1a0 −
κ1F¯
r
κ
(
θF¯
r
− θa0 −
γ2∆C¯
1Σ1′
)
κ
(
1F¯
r
− 1a0
)

 ,
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A1(t) ≡ −


1− (r+κ)γ2∆
1Σ1′
0
0
0

 ,
A2(t) ≡


0 0 r + κ 0
0 0 0 r + κ
0 0 −κ 0
0 0 0 −κ

 ,
B1(t) ≡


θσ 0
1σ 0
0 φθσ
r+κ
0 φ1σ
r+κ

 ,
B2(t) ≡ −


0
0
sγ2∆
1Σ1′
0

 .
The quantities (b ◦ b)(t), (b ◦B)(t), and (B ◦B)(t), defined in LS (10.80) are
(b ◦ b)(t) = s2,
(b ◦B)(t) = −
(
0 0 s
2γ2∆
1Σ1′ 0
)
,
(B ◦B)(t) =


θΣθ′ 1Σθ′ 0 0
1Σθ′ 1Σ1′ 0 0
0 0 φ
2θΣθ′
(r+κ)2 +
s2γ2
2
∆2
(1Σ1′)2
φ21Σθ′
(r+κ)2
0 0 φ
2
1Σθ′
(r+κ)2
φ21Σ1′
(r+κ)2

 .
Theorem 10.3 of LS (first subequation of (10.81)) implies that
dCˆt =κ(C¯ − Cˆt)dt − β1
{
dξ1t −
[
(r + κ)θa0 −
κθF¯
r
+ (r + κ)ξ3t −
(
1−
(r + κ)γ2∆
1Σ1′
)
Cˆt
]
dt
−
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
[
dξ2t −
[
(r + κ)1a0 −
κ1F¯
r
+ (r + κ)ξ4t
]
dt
]}
− β2
{
dξ3t − κ
(
θF¯
r
− θa0 −
γ2∆C¯
1Σ1′
− ξ3t
)
dt
−
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
[
dξ4t − κ
(
1F¯
r
− 1a0 − ξ4t
)
dt
]}
(B.5)
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Eq. (33) follows from (B.5) by noting that the term in dt after each dξit, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, is Et(dξit).
In subsequent proofs we use a different form of (33), where we replace each dξit, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, by
its value in (B.1)-(B.4):
dCˆt = κ(C¯−Cˆt)dt−β1
[
pfσdB
D
t −
(
1−
(r + κ)γ2∆
1Σ1′
)
(Ct − Cˆt)dt
]
−β2
(
φpfσdB
F
t
r + κ
−
sγ2∆dB
C
t
1Σ1′
)
.
(B.6)
Eq. (36) follows from Theorem 10.3 of LS (second subequation of (10.81)).
Proof of Proposition 5: Eqs. (1), (2), (5), (31), (32) and (B.6) imply that stock returns are
dRt =
{
ra0 +
[
g1Cˆt + g2Ct − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯
]
Σp′f
}
dt +
(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBDt
+
φ
r + κ
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBFt − sγ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
Σp′fdB
C
t . (B.7)
where
g1 ≡ (r + κ+ ρ)γ1, (B.8)
g2 ≡ (r + κ)γ2 − ργ1, (B.9)
ρ ≡ β1
(
1−
(r + κ)γ2∆
1Σ1′
)
. (B.10)
Eqs. (5), (10), (30), (B.6) and (B.7) imply that
d
(
rα¯Wt + q¯0 + (q¯1, q¯2)X¯t +
1
2
X¯ ′tQ¯X¯t
)
= G¯dt+
[
rα¯zˆt
(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
− β1f¯1(X¯t)pfσ
]
dBDt
+
φ
r + κ
[
rα¯zˆt
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
− β2f¯1(X¯t)pfσ
]
dBFt
− s
[
rα¯γ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
zˆtΣp
′
f −
β2γ2∆f¯1(X¯t)
1Σ1′
− f¯2(X¯t)
]
dBCt , (B.11)
where
f¯1(X¯t) ≡ q¯1 + q¯11Cˆt + q¯12Ct,
f¯2(X¯t) ≡ q¯2 + q¯12Cˆt + q¯22Ct,
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G¯ ≡rα¯
(
rWt + zˆt
{
ra0 +
[
g1Cˆt + g2Ct − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯
]
Σp′f
}
+B(b0 − b1Cˆt)− c¯t
)
+ f¯1(X¯t)
[
κ(C¯ − Cˆt) + ρ(Ct − Cˆt)
]
+ f¯2(X¯t)κ(C¯ − Ct)
+
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q¯11
1Σ1′
+
s2β2γ2∆q¯12
1Σ1′
+
1
2
s2q¯22,
and q¯ij denotes the element (i, j) of the symmetric 2×2 matrix Q¯. Eqs. (37) and (B.11) imply that
DV¯ =− V¯
{
G¯−
1
2
(rα¯)2f zˆtΣzˆ
′
t
−
1
2
β1
[
rα¯γ1zˆtΣp
′
f − f¯1(X¯t)
] [
rα¯
(
2 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
zˆtΣp
′
f −
β1∆f¯1(X¯t)
1Σ1′
]
−
1
2
φ2β2
(r + κ)2
[
rα¯γ1zˆtΣp
′
f − f¯1(X¯t)
] [
rα¯
(
2 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
zˆtΣp
′
f −
β2∆f¯1(X¯t)
1Σ1′
]
−
1
2
s2
[
rα¯γ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
zˆtΣp
′
f −
β2γ2∆f¯1(X¯t)
1Σ1′
− f¯2(X¯t)
]2}
. (B.12)
Substituting (B.12) into the Bellman equation (14), we can write the first-order conditions with
respect to c¯t and zˆt as (A.3) and
h¯(X¯t) = rα¯(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)zˆ
′
t, (B.13)
respectively, where
h¯(X¯t) ≡ ra0 +
[
g1Cˆt + g2Ct − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ + k1f¯1(X¯t) + k2f¯2(X¯t)
]
Σp′f , (B.14)
k ≡ β1γ1
(
2 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
+
φ2β2γ1
(r + κ)2
(
2 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
+ s2γ22
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)2
, (B.15)
k1 ≡ β1
(
1 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
+
φ2β2
(r + κ)2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
+
s2β2γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
, (B.16)
k2 ≡ s
2γ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
. (B.17)
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Proceeding as in the case of symmetric information, we can derive counterparts to (A.8) and (A.9),
and write the Bellman equation (14) in the equivalent form
1
2
h¯(X¯t)
′(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)
−1h¯(X¯t) + rα¯B(b0 − b1Cˆt)− r
[
q¯0 + (q¯1, q¯2)X¯t +
1
2
X¯ ′tQ¯X¯t
]
+ f¯1(X¯t)
[
κ(C¯ − Cˆt) + ρ(Ct − Cˆt)
]
+ f¯2(X¯t)κ(C¯ −Ct)
+
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q¯11
1Σ1′
+
s2β2γ2∆q¯12
1Σ1′
+
1
2
s2q¯22 + β − r + r log(r)
−
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
]
∆f¯1(X¯t)
2
1Σ1′
−
1
2
s2
[
β2γ2∆f¯1(X¯t)
1Σ1′
+ f¯2(X¯t)
]2
= 0. (B.18)
Eq. (B.18) is quadratic in X¯t. Identifying quadratic, linear and constant terms, yields six scalar
equations in (q¯0, q¯1, q¯2, Q¯).
Proof of Proposition 6: Dynamics under the investor’s filtration can be deduced from those
under the manager’s by replacing Ct by the investor’s expectation Cˆt. Eq. (B.6) implies that the
dynamics of Cˆt are
dCˆt = κ(C¯ − Cˆt)dt − β1pfσdBˆ
D
t − β2
(
φpfσdB
F
t
r + κ
−
sγ2∆dB
C
t
1Σ1′
)
, (B.19)
where BˆDt is a Brownian motion under the investor’s filtration. Eq. (B.7) implies that the net-of-cost
return of the active fund is
ztdRt − Ctdt =zt
{
ra0 +
[
(g1 + g2)Cˆt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯
]
Σp′f
}
dt− Cˆtdt+ zt
(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBˆDt
+ zt
φ
r + κ
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBFt − sγ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
ztΣp
′
fdB
C
t , (B.20)
and the return of the index fund is
1dRt =1
{
ra0 +
[
(g1 + g2)Cˆt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯
]
Σp′f
}
dt+ 1
(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBˆDt
+ 1
φ
r + κ
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBFt − sγ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
1Σp′fdB
C
t . (B.21)
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Eqs. (16), (B.19), (B.20) and (B.21) imply that
d
(
rαWt + q0 + q1Cˆt +
1
2
q11Cˆ
2
t
)
= Gdt +
[
rα(xt1+ ytzt)
(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
− β1f(Cˆt)pfσ
]
dBˆDt
+
φ
r + κ
[
rα(xt1+ ytzt)
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
− β2f(Cˆt)pfσ
]
dBFt
− s
[
rα¯γ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
(xt1+ ytzt)Σp
′
f −
β2γ2∆f(Cˆt)
1Σ1′
]
dBCt , (B.22)
where
f(Cˆt) ≡ q1 + q11Cˆt
and
G ≡rα
(
rWt + (xt1+ ytzt)
{
ra0 +
[
(g1 + g2)Cˆt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯
]
Σp′f
}
− ytCˆt − ct
)
+ f(Cˆt)κ(C¯ − Cˆt) +
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q11
1Σ1′
.
Eqs. (37) and (B.11) imply that
DV =− V
{
G−
1
2
(rα)2f(xt1+ ytzt)Σ(xt1+ ytzt)
′
−
1
2
β1
[
rαγ1(xt1+ ytzt)Σp
′
f − f(Cˆt)
] [
rα
(
2 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
(xt1+ ytzt)Σp
′
f −
β1∆f(Cˆt)
1Σ1′
]
−
1
2
φ2β2
(r + κ)2
[
rαγ1(xt1+ ytzt)Σp
′
f − f(Cˆt)
] [
rα
(
2 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
(xt1+ ytzt)Σp
′
f −
β2∆f(Cˆt)
1Σ1′
]
−
1
2
s2
[
rαγ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
(xt1+ ytzt)Σp
′
f −
β2γ2∆f(Cˆt)
1Σ1′
]2
 . (B.23)
Substituting (B.12) into the Bellman equation (14), we can write the first-order conditions with
respect to ct, xt and yt as (A.13),
1h(Cˆt) = rα1(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)(xt1+ ytzt)
′, (B.24)
zth(Cˆt)− Cˆt = rαzt(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)(xt1+ ytzt)
′, (B.25)
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respectively, where
h(Cˆt) ≡ ra0 +
[
(g1 + g2)Cˆt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ + k1f(Cˆt)
]
Σp′f . (B.26)
Proceeding as in the case of symmetric information, we can derive counterparts to (A.17), (A.18),
(A.24), and write the Bellman equation (18) in the equivalent form
1
2D
{[
1h(Cˆt)
]2
θ(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)θ
′ − 2
[
θh(Cˆt)− Cˆt
]
1h(Cˆt)1(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)θ
′
+
[
θh(Cˆt)− Cˆt
]2
1(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)1
′
}
− r
(
q0 + q1Cˆt +
1
2
q11Cˆ
2
t
)
+ f(Cˆt)κ(C¯ − Cˆt) +
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆[q11 − f(Cˆt)
2]
1Σ1′
+ β − r + r log(r) = 0,
(B.27)
where
D ≡ θ(fΣ+ kΣpfp
′
fΣ)θ
′1(fΣ+ kΣpfp
′
fΣ)1
′ −
[
1(fΣ+ kΣpfp
′
fΣ)θ
′
]2
.
Eq. (B.27) is quadratic in Cˆt. Identifying terms in Cˆ
2
t , Cˆt, and constants, yields three scalar
equations in (q0, q1, q11). The proof that the optimal control yt is linear in Cˆt is as in the case of
symmetric information.
Proof of Proposition 7: We first impose market clearing and derive the constants (a0, b0, b1, γ1, γ2)
as functions of (q¯1, q¯2, Q¯, q1, q11). Setting zt = θ − xt1 and y¯t = 1 − yt, we can write (B.13) and
(B.24) as
h¯(X¯t) = rα¯(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)(1− yt)(θ − xt1)
′, (B.28)
1h(Cˆt) = rα1(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ) [xt1+ yt(θ − xt1)]
′ , (B.29)
respectively. Multiplying (B.24) by xt and adding to (B.25), we similarly find
θh(Cˆt)− Cˆt = rαθ(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ) [xt1+ yt(θ − xt1)]
′ . (B.30)
Premultiplying (B.28) by 1, dividing by rα¯, and adding to (B.29) divided by rα, we find
1
[
h(Cˆt)
rα
+
h¯(X¯t)
rα¯
]
= 1(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)θ
′. (B.31)
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Eq. (B.31) is linear in X¯t. The terms in Cˆt and Ct are zero because 1Σp
′
f = 0. Identifying constant
terms, we find (A.29). Substituting (A.29) into (B.29), we find (A.30).
Substituting (A.30) into (B.28), and using (30), we find
h¯(X¯t) = rα¯(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)
[
α
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
1+ (1− b0 + b1Cˆt)pf
]′
. (B.32)
Eq. (B.32) is linear in X¯t. Identifying terms in Cˆt, we find
g1Σp
′
f + (k1q¯11 + k2q¯12)Σp
′
f = rα¯b1(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)p
′
f
⇒ g1 + k1q¯11 + k2q¯12 = rα¯b1
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)
. (B.33)
Identifying terms in Ct, we find
g2Σp
′
f + (k1q¯12 + k2q¯22)Σp
′
f = 0⇒ g2 + k1q¯12 + k2q¯22 = 0. (B.34)
Identifying constant terms, we find
a0 =
αα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Σ1′ +
[
κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − k1q¯1 − k2q¯2
r
+ α¯(1− b0)
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)]
Σp′f . (B.35)
Premultiplying (B.28) by θ, dividing by rα¯, and adding to (B.30) divided by rα, we find
θ
[
h(Cˆt)
rα
+
h¯(X¯t)
rα¯
]
−
Cˆt
rα
= θ(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)θ
′. (B.36)
Eq. (B.36) is linear in X¯t. The terms in Ct cancel because of (B.34). Identifying terms in Cˆt, we
find
g1 + g2 + k1q11
rα
+
g1 + k1q¯11 + k2q¯12
rα¯
=
1Σ1′
rα∆
. (B.37)
Identifying constant terms, we find
( r
rα
+
r
rα¯
)
θa0−
[
κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − k1q1
rα
+
κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − k1q¯1 − k2q¯2
rα¯
]
∆
1Σ1′
= θ(fΣ+kΣp′fpfΣ)θ
′.
(B.38)
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Using (B.35), we can write (B.38) as
b0 =
α¯
α+ α¯
+
k1q1 − (k1q¯1 + k2q¯2)
r(α+ α¯)
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
) . (B.39)
Substituting b0 from (B.39) into (B.35), we find
a0 =
αα¯f
α+ α¯
Σθ′ +
[
κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯
r
−
α(k1q¯1 + k2q¯2) + α¯k1q1
r(α+ α¯)
+
αα¯k∆
(α+ α¯)1Σ1′
]
Σp′f . (B.40)
The system of equations characterizing equilibrium is as follows. The endogenous variables
are (a0, b0, b1, γ1, γ2, β1, β2, sˆ
2, q¯1, q¯2, Q¯, q1, q11). (As in Proposition 3, we can drop (q¯0, q0).) The
equations linking them are (34)-(36), (B.33), (B.34), (B.37), (B.39), (B.40), the five equations
derived from (B.18) by identifying linear and quadratic terms, and the two equations derived from
(B.27) by identifying linear and quadratic terms. We next simplify the latter two sets of equations,
using implications of market clearing.
Consider the equations derived from (B.18). Using (B.39), we can write (B.32) as
h¯(X¯t) =
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Σ1′ + h¯1(Cˆt)Σp
′
f , (B.41)
where
h¯1(Cˆt) ≡
rαα¯
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
)
α+ α¯
+
α¯(k1q¯1 + k2q¯2 − k1q1)
α+ α¯
+ rα¯b1
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)
Cˆt.
Noting that
(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)1
′ = fΣ1′ ⇒ 1Σ(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)
−1 =
1
f
, (B.42)
(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)p
′
f =
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)
Σp′f ⇒ pfΣ(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)
−1 =
pf
f + k∆
1Σ1′
, (B.43)
and using (B.41), we find
1
2
h¯(X¯t)
′(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)
−1h¯(X¯t) =
r2α2α¯2f(1Σθ′)2
2(α + α¯)21Σ1′
+
h¯1(Cˆt)
2 ∆
1Σ1′
2
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
) . (B.44)
We next substitute (B.44) into (B.18), and identify terms. Identifying terms in Cˆ2t , CˆtCt and C
2
t ,
we find
1
2
X¯ ′t
(
Q¯R¯2Q¯+ Q¯R¯1 + R¯
′
1Q¯− R¯0
)
X¯t = 0, (B.45)
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where
R¯2 ≡
( [
β21 +
φ2β2
2
(r+κ)2
+
s2β2
2
γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
]
∆
1Σ1′
s2β2γ2∆
1Σ1′
s2β2γ2∆
1Σ1′ s
2
)
,
R¯1 ≡
(
r
2 + κ+ ρ −ρ
0 r2 + κ
)
,
R¯0 ≡
(
r2α¯2b21
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
)
∆
1Σ1′ 0
0 0
)
.
Eq. (B.45) must hold for all X¯t. Since the square matrix in (B.45) is symmetric, it must equal zero,
and this yields the algebraic Riccati equation
Q¯R¯2Q¯+ Q¯R¯1 + R¯
′
1Q¯− R¯0 = 0. (B.46)
We next identify terms in Cˆt and Ct. Terms in Cˆt yield
(r + κ+ ρ) q¯1 +
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
]
∆q¯1q¯11
1Σ1′
+ s2
(
β2γ2∆q¯1
1Σ1′
+ q¯2
)(
β2γ2∆q¯11
1Σ1′
+ q¯12
)
− rα¯b1
[
rαα¯
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
)
α+ α¯
+
α¯(k1q¯1 + k2q¯2 − k1q1)
α+ α¯
]
− κC¯(q¯11 + q¯12) + rα¯Bb1 = 0, (B.47)
and terms in Ct yield
(r + κ)q¯2 − ρq¯1 +
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
]
∆q¯1q¯12
1Σ1′
+ s2
(
β2γ2∆q¯1
1Σ1′
+ q¯2
)(
β2γ2∆q¯12
1Σ1′
+ q¯22
)
− κC¯(q¯12 + q¯22) = 0. (B.48)
Consider next the equations derived from (B.27). Substituting h¯(X¯t) from (B.41) into (B.31),
we find
1h(Cˆt) =
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′. (B.49)
Following the same procedure for (B.36) instead of (B.31), we find
θh(Cˆt)− Ct =
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
(1Σθ′)2
1Σ1′
+
[
rα
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)
−
α
α¯
h¯1(Ct)
]
∆
1Σ1′
. (B.50)
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The denominator D in (B.27) is
D = f∆
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)
. (B.51)
Using (B.49), (B.50) and (B.51), we find that the equation derived from (B.27) by identifying terms
in Cˆ2t is
(r + 2κ)q11 +
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q211
1Σ1′
− r2α2b21
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)
∆
1Σ1′
= 0, (B.52)
and the equation derived from (B.27) by identifying terms in Cˆt is
(r + κ)q1 +
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q1q11
1Σ1′
+ rαb1
{
rαα¯
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
)
α+ α¯
+
α[k1q1 − (k1q¯1 + k2q¯2)]
α+ α¯
}
∆
1Σ1′
− κC¯q11 = 0. (B.53)
Solving for equilibrium amounts to solving the system of (34)-(36), (B.33), (B.34), (B.37),
(B.39), (B.40), (B.46)-(B.48), (B.52) and (B.53) in the unknowns (a0, b0, b1, γ1, γ2, β1, β2, sˆ
2, q¯1, q¯2, Q¯, q1, q11).
This reduces to solving the system of (B.33), (B.34), (B.37), (B.46) and (B.52) in the unknowns
(b1, γ1, γ2, Q¯, q11): given (b1, γ1, γ2, Q¯, q11), (β1, β2, sˆ
2) can be determined from (34)-(36), (q¯1, q¯2, q1)
from the linear system of (B.47), (B.48) and (B.53), and (a0, b0) from (B.39) and (B.40). [[[To be
completed.]]]
Proof of Corollary 3: Stocks’ expected returns are
Et(dRt) =
{
ra0 +
[
g1Cˆt + g2Ct − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯
]
Σp′f
}
dt
=
{
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Σ1′ +
[
g1Cˆt + g2Ct −
α(k1q¯1 + k2q¯2) + α¯k1q1
α+ α¯
+
rαα¯
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
)
α+ α¯
]
Σp′f
}
dt,
(B.54)
where the first step follows from (B.7) and the second from (B.40). Using (B.42) and (B.43), we
can write (B.54) as
Et(dRt) =
[
rαα¯
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)1
′ + Λt(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)p
′
f
]
dt. (B.55)
Eq. (B.55) is equivalent to (39) because of (41).
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Proof of Corollary 4: The corollary follows from (B.7).
Proof of Proposition 8: Rearranging (B.15), we find
k = 2
{
β1 + β2
[
φ2
(r + κ)2
+
s2γ22∆
1Σ1′
]}
γ1 + s
2γ22 +
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆γ21
1Σ1′
. (B.56)
Rearranging (35), we find
β2
[
φ2
(r + κ)2
+
s2γ22∆
1Σ1′
]
= s2γ2, (B.57)
and rearranging (36), we find
sˆ4
[
1− (r + k)
γ2∆
1Σ1′
]2 1Σ1′
∆
+
s4γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
φ2
(r+κ)2 +
s2γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
= s2 − 2κsˆ2
⇒
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆
1Σ1′
= s2 − 2κsˆ2, (B.58)
where the second step follows from (34) and (35). Substituting (B.57) and (B.58) into (B.56), we
find
k = 2β1γ1 + s
2(γ1 + γ2)
2 − 2κsˆ2γ21
= s2(γ1 + γ2)
2 + 2sˆ2γ1
[
1Σ1′
∆
− κγ1 − (r + κ)γ2
]
, (B.59)
where the second step follows from (34). [[[To be completed.]]]
Proof of Corollary 5: The corollary follows from Proposition 8 by considering the diagonal
elements of the covariance matrix.
Proof of Corollary 6: Using (B.7) and proceeding as in the derivation of (A.61), we find
Covt(dRt, dR
′
t′) = Covt
[(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBDt +
φ
r + κ
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBFt
−sγ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
Σp′fdB
C
t ,
(
g1Cˆt′ + g2Ct′
)
pfΣdt
]
. (B.60)
Using the dynamics (5) and (B.6), we can express (Cˆt′ , Ct′) as a function of their time t values and
the Brownian shocks (dBDu , dB
F
u , dB
C
u ) for u ∈ [t, t
′]. The covariance (B.60) depends only on how
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the Brownian shocks at time t impact (Cˆt′ , Ct′). (See the proof of Corollary 6.) To compute this
impact, we set (Cˆt, Ct, C¯) and the Brownian shocks for u > t to zero. This amounts to solving the
“impulse-response” dynamics
dCt = −κCtdt,
dCˆt =
[
−κCˆt + ρ(Ct − Cˆt)
]
dt,
with the initial conditions
Ct = sdB
C
t ,
Cˆt = −β1pfσdB
D
t − β2
(
φpfσdB
F
t
r + κ
−
sγ2∆dB
C
t
1Σ1′
)
.
The solution to these dynamics is
Ct′ = e
−κ(t′−t)sdBCt , (B.61)
Cˆt′ = e
−κ(t′−t)sdBCt − e
−(κ+ρ)(t′−t)
[
β1pfσdB
D
t +
φβ2pfσdB
F
t
r + κ
+ s
(
1−
β2γ2∆
1Σ1′
)
dBCt
]
.
(B.62)
Substituting (B.61) and (B.62) into (B.60), we find (42) with
χ1 ≡ −g1
{
β1
(
1 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
+
[
φ2β2
(r + κ)2
− s2γ2
(
1−
β2γ2∆
1Σ1′
)](
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)}
, (B.63)
χ2 ≡ −s
2(g1 + g2)γ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
. (B.64)
Eq. (35) implies that the term in square brackets in (B.63) is zero, and therefore
χ1 = −g1β1
(
1 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1
)
< 0.
Eqs. (B.8) and (B.9) imply that
χ2 = −s
2(r + κ)(γ1 + γ2)γ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1
)
< 0.
58
C Asymmetric Information and Gradual Adjustment
Proof of Proposition 9: Eq. (B.6), describing the dynamics of Cˆt, remains valid under gradual
adjustment. Eq. (B.7) is replaced by
dRt =
{
ra0 +
[
g˜1Cˆt + g2Ct + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3
]
Σp′f
}
dt+
(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBDt
+
φ
r + κ
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBFt − sγ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
Σp′fdB
C
t , (C.1)
where
g˜1 ≡ g1 + b1γ3, (C.2)
g3 ≡ (r + b2)γ3. (C.3)
Eq. (B.12) remains valid, provided that we set
G¯ ≡rα¯
(
rWt + zˆt
{
ra0 +
[
g˜1Cˆt + g2Ct + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3
]
Σp′f
}
+Byt − c¯t
)
+ f¯1(X¯t)
[
κ(C¯ − Cˆt) + ρ(Ct − Cˆt)
]
+ f¯2(X¯t)κ(C¯ − Ct) + f¯3(X¯t)(b0 − b1Cˆt − b2yt)
+
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q¯11
1Σ1′
+
s2β2γ2∆q¯12
1Σ1′
+
1
2
s2q¯22,
f¯1(X¯t) ≡ q¯1 + q¯11Cˆt + q¯12Ct + q¯13yt,
f¯2(X¯t) ≡ q¯2 + q¯12Cˆt + q¯22Ct + q¯23yt,
f¯3(X¯t) ≡ q¯3 + q¯13Cˆt + q¯23Ct + q¯33yt,
where q¯ij denotes the element (i, j) of the symmetric 3 × 3 matrix Q¯. The first-order condition
(B.13) remains valid, provided that we set
h¯(X¯t) ≡ ra0 +
[
g˜1Cˆt + g2Ct + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3 + k1f¯1(X¯t) + k2f¯2(X¯t)
]
Σp′f . (C.4)
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Eq. (B.18) becomes
1
2
h¯(X¯t)
′(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)
−1h¯(X¯t) + rα¯Byt − r
[
q¯0 + (q¯1, q¯2, q¯3)X¯t +
1
2
X¯ ′tQ¯X¯t
]
+ f¯1(X¯t)
[
κ(C¯ − Cˆt) + ρ(Ct − Cˆt)
]
+ f¯2(X¯t)κ(C¯ −Ct) + f¯3(X¯t)(b0 − b1Cˆt − b2yt)
+
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q¯11
1Σ1′
+
s2β2γ2∆q¯12
1Σ1′
+
1
2
s2q¯22 + β − r + r log(r)
−
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
]
∆f¯1(X¯t)
2
1Σ1′
−
1
2
s2
[
β2γ2∆f¯1(X¯t)
1Σ1′
+ f¯2(X¯t)
]2
= 0. (C.5)
Eq. (C.5) is quadratic in X¯t. Identifying quadratic, linear and constant terms, yields ten scalar
equations in (q¯0, q¯1, q¯2, q¯3, Q¯).
Proof of Proposition 10: Eq. (B.19), describing the dynamics of Cˆt under the investor’s filtration,
remains valid under gradual adjustment. Eqs. (B.20) and (B.21) are replaced by
ztdRt − Ctdt = zt
{
ra0 +
[
(g˜1 + g2)Cˆt + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3
]
Σp′f
}
dt− Cˆtdt
+zt
(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBˆDt +zt
φ
r + κ
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBFt −sγ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
ztΣp
′
fdB
C
t ,
(C.6)
and
1dRt = 1
{
ra0 +
[
(g˜1 + g2)Cˆt + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3
]
Σp′f
}
dt
+1
(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBˆDt +1
φ
r + κ
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBFt −sγ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
1Σp′fdB
C
t ,
(C.7)
respectively. Suppose that the investor optimizes over (ct, xt) but follows the control vt given by
(45). Eq. (B.23) remains valid, provided that we set
G ≡rα
[
rWt + (xt1+ ytzt)
{
ra0 +
[
(g˜1 + g2)Cˆt + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3
]
Σp′f
}
− ytCˆt −
ψv2t
2
− ct
]
+ f1(Xt)κ(C¯ − Cˆt) + f2(Xt)vt +
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q11
1Σ1′
,
f1(Xt) ≡ q1 + q11Cˆt + q12yt,
f2(Xt) ≡ q2 + q12Cˆt + q22yt,
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and replace f(Cˆt) by f1(Xt), where qij denotes the element (i, j) of the symmetric 2× 2 matrix Q.
The first-order condition (B.24) is replaced by
1h(Xt) = rα1(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)(xt1+ ytzt)
′, (C.8)
where
h(Xt) ≡ ra0 +
[
(g˜1 + g2)Cˆt + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3 + k1f1(Xt)
]
Σp′f . (C.9)
The counterpart to (A.17) is
rα(xt1+ ytzt)
{
ra0 +
[
(g˜1 + g2)Cˆt + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3
]
Σp′f
}
− rαytCˆt − rα
ψv2t
2
− r
[
q0 + (q1, q2)Xt +
1
2
X ′tQXt
]
+ f1(Xt)κ(C¯ − Cˆt) + f2(Xt)vt
+
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆[q11 − f1(Xt)
2]
1Σ1′
+ β − r + r log(r)
−
1
2
(rα)2(xt1+ ytzt)(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)(xt1+ ytzt)
′ + rαk1f1(Xt)(xt1+ ytzt)Σp
′
f = 0. (C.10)
The terms in (C.10) that involve xt1+ ytzt can be written as
rα(xt1+ ytzt)
{
ra0 +
[
(g˜1 + g2)Cˆt + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3
]
Σp′f
}
−
1
2
(rα)2(xt1+ ytzt)(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)(xt1+ ytzt)
′ + rαk1f1(Xt)(xt1+ ytzt)Σp
′
f
= rα(xt1+ ytzt)h(Xt)−
1
2
(rα)2(xt1+ ytzt)(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)(xt1+ ytzt)
′,
= rαytθh(Xt)−
1
2
(rα)2y2t θ(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)θ
′
+ rαxt(1− yt)
{
1h(Xt)−
1
2
rα1(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ) [xt(1− yt)1+ 2ytθ]
′
}′
, (C.11)
where the first step follows from (C.9) and the second from the equilibrium condition zt = θ− xt1.
Using zt = θ − xt1, we can write (C.8) as
1h(Xt) = rα1(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ) [xt(1− yt)1+ ytθ]
′ (C.12)
⇒xt(1− yt) =
1h(Xt)− rαytf1Σθ
′
rαf1Σ1′
. (C.13)
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Eqs. (C.12) and (C.13) imply that
rαxt(1− yt)
{
1h(Xt)−
1
2
rα1(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ) [xt(1− yt)1+ 2ytθ]
′
}′
=
1
2
[rαxt(1− yt)]
21(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)1
′
=
[1h(Xt)− rαfyt1Σθ
′]2
2f1Σ1′
. (C.14)
Substituting (C.11) and (C.14) into (C.10), we find
rαytθh(Xt)−
1
2
(rα)2y2t θ(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)θ
′ +
[1h(Xt)− rαfyt1Σθ
′]2
2f1Σ1′
− rαytCˆt − rα
ψv2t
2
− r
[
q0 + (q1, q2)Xt +
1
2
X ′tQXt
]
+ f1(Xt)κ(C¯ − Cˆt) + f2(Xt)vt
+
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆[q11 − f1(Xt)
2]
1Σ1′
+ β − r + r log(r) = 0. (C.15)
Since vt in (45) is linear in Xt, (C.15) is quadratic in Xt. Identifying quadratic, linear and constant
terms, yields six scalar equations in (q0, q1, q2, Q).
We next consider the investor’s optimization over vt and derive a first-order condition under
which the control (45) is optimal. Suppose that the investor deviates from the control (45), adding
ωdǫ over the interval [t, t+ dǫ] and subtracting ωdǫ over the interval [t+ dt− dǫ, t+ dt], where the
infinitesimal dǫ > 0 is o(dt). The increase in adjustment cost over the first interval is ψvtω(dǫ)
2
and over the second interval is −ψvt+dtω(dǫ)
2. These changes reduce the investor’s wealth at time
t+ dt by
ψvtω(dǫ)
2(1 + rdt)− ψvt+dtω(dǫ)
2
= ψω(dǫ)2(rvtdt− dvt)
= ψω(dǫ)2(rvtdt+ b1dCˆt + b2dyt)
= ψω(dǫ)2
[
(r + b2)vtdt+ b1dCˆt
]
= ψω(dǫ)2
{
(r + b2)(b0 − b1Cˆt − b2yt)dt
+b1
[
κ(C¯ − Cˆt)dt − β1pfσdBˆ
D
t − β2
(
φpfσdB
F
t
r + κ
−
sγ2∆dB
C
t
1Σ1′
)]}
, (C.16)
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where the third step follows from (45), the fourth from the definition of vt, and the fifth from (45)
and (B.19). The change in the investor’s wealth between t and t + dt is derived from (16), (C.6)
and (C.7), by subtracting (C.16) and replacing yt in the term (xt1+ ytzt) by yt + ω(dǫ)
2:
dWt =Gωdt− ψω(dǫ)
2b1
[
κ(C¯ − Cˆt)dt − β1pfσdBˆ
D
t − β2
(
φpfσdB
F
t
r + κ
−
sγ2∆dB
C
t
1Σ1′
)]
{
xt1+
[
yt + ω(dǫ)
2
]
zt
}[(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBˆDt +
φ
r + κ
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBFt
−sγ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
Σp′fdB
C
t
]
, (C.17)
where
Gω ≡rWt +
{
xt1+
[
yt + ω(dǫ)
2
]
zt
}{
ra0 +
[
(g˜1 + g2)Cˆt + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3
]
Σp′f
}
−
[
yt + ω(dǫ)
2
]
Cˆt −
ψv2t
2
− ct − ψω(dǫ)
2(r + b2)(b0 − b1Cˆt − b2yt).
The investor’s position in the active fund at t + dt is the same under the deviation as under no
deviation. Therefore, the investor’s expected utility at t + dt is given by the value function (47)
with the wealth Wt+dt being determined by (C.17). The drift DV corresponding to the change in
the value function between t and t+ dt is given by (B.23), provided that we set
G ≡ rαGω + f1ω(Xt)κ(C¯ − Cˆt) + f2(Xt)vt +
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q11
1Σ1′
,
f1ω(Xt) ≡ f1(Xt)− rαψω(dǫ)
2b1,
and replace f(Cˆt) by f1ω(Xt). The drift is maximum for ω = 0, and this yields the first-order
condition
zt
[
h(Xt)− rαψb1k1ytΣp
′
f
]
− Cˆt = rαzt(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)(xt1+ ytzt)
′ + ψhψ(Xt), (C.18)
where
hψ(Xt) ≡ (r+ b2)(b0 − b1Cˆt − b2yt) + b1κ(C¯ − Cˆt)− b1
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆f1(Xt)
1Σ1′
.
Using (C.8) and the equilibrium condition zt = θ − xt1, we can write (C.18) as
θ
[
h(Xt)− rαψb1k1ytΣp
′
f
]
− Cˆt = rαθ(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)(xt1+ ytzt)
′ + ψhψ(Xt). (C.19)
63
Using (C.13) and zt = θ − xt1, we can write (C.19) as
θ
[
h(Xt)− rαψb1k1ytΣp
′
f
]
−Cˆt = rαθ(fΣ+kΣp
′
fpfΣ)
[
ytθ +
1h(Xt)− rαytf1Σθ
′
rαf1Σ1′
1
]′
+ψhψ(Xt).
(C.20)
Eq. (C.20) is linear in Xt. Identifying linear and constant terms, yields three scalar equations in
(b0, b1, b2).
Proof of Proposition 11: We first impose market clearing and derive the constants (a0, b0, b1, b2, γ1, γ2, γ3)
as functions of (q¯1, q¯2, q¯3, Q¯, q1, q2, Q). Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 7, we can write
the manager’s first-order condition (B.13) as
h¯(X¯t) = rα¯(fΣ+ kΣp
′
fpfΣ)
[
α
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
1+ (1− yt)pf
]′
. (C.21)
Eq. (B.28) is linear in X¯t. Identifying terms in Cˆt, Ct, and yt, we find, respectively,
g˜1 + k1q¯11 + k2q¯12 = 0, (C.22)
g2 + k1q¯12 + k2q¯22 = 0, (C.23)
g3 + k1q¯13 + k2q¯23 = −rα¯
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)
. (C.24)
Identifying constant terms, we find
a0 =
αα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Σ1′ +
[
κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ + b0γ3 − k1q¯1 − k2q¯2
r
+ α¯
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)]
Σp′f . (C.25)
Eqs. (C.9) and (C.25) imply that
1h(Xt) =
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′. (C.26)
Using (C.26), we can write (C.20) as
θ
[
h(Xt)− rαψb1k1ytΣp
′
f
]
−Cˆt = rαθ(fΣ+kΣp
′
fpfΣ)
[
α¯
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
1+ ytpf
]′
+ψhψ(Xt). (C.27)
Premultiplying (C.21) by θ, dividing by rα¯, and adding to (C.27) divided by rα, we find
θ
[
h(Xt)
rα
+
h¯(X¯t)
rα¯
− ψb1k1ytΣp
′
f
]
−
Cˆt
rα
= θ(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)θ
′ +
ψhψ(Xt)
rα
. (C.28)
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Eq. (C.28) is linear in X¯t. The terms in Ct cancel because of (C.23). Identifying terms in Cˆt, we
find
g˜1 + g2 + k1q11
rα
+
g˜1 + k1q¯11 + k2q¯12
rα¯
=
1Σ1′
rα∆
−
ψb1
{
(r+κ+b2)1Σ1′
∆ +
[
β21 +
φ2β2
2
(r+κ)2
+
s2β2
2
γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
]
q11
}
rα
.
(C.29)
Identifying terms in yt, we find
g3 + k1q12
rα
+
g3 + k1q¯13 + k2q¯23
rα¯
−ψb1k1 = −
ψ
{
b2(r+b2)1Σ1′
∆ + b1
[
β21 +
φ2β2
2
(r+κ)2
+
s2β2
2
γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
]
q12
}
rα
.
(C.30)
Identifying constant terms, we find( r
rα
+
r
rα¯
)
θa0 −
[
κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ + b0γ3 − k1q1
rα
+
κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ + b0γ3 − k1q¯1 − k2q¯2
rα¯
]
∆
1Σ1′
= θ(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)θ
′ +
ψ
{
b0(r + b2) + b1κC¯ − b1
[
β21 +
φ2β2
2
(r+κ)2
+
s2β2
2
γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q1
1Σ1′
}
rα
. (C.31)
The system of equations characterizing equilibrium is as follows. The endogenous variables
are (a0, b0, b1, b2, γ1, γ2, γ3, β1, β2, sˆ
2, q¯1, q¯2, q¯3, Q¯, q1, q2, Q). (As in Propositions 3 and 7, we can
drop (q¯0, q0).) The equations linking them are (34)-(36), (C.22)-(C.25), (C.29)-(C.31), the nine
equations derived from (C.5) by identifying linear and quadratic terms, and the five equations
derived from (C.15) by identifying linear and quadratic terms. We next simplify the latter two sets
of equations, using implications of market clearing.
Consider the equations derived from (C.5). Eq. (C.21) implies that
h¯(X¯t) =
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Σ1′ + rα¯
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)
(1− yt)Σp
′
f . (C.32)
Using (B.42), (B.43) and (C.32), we find
1
2
h¯(X¯t)
′(fΣ+ kΣp′fpfΣ)
−1h¯(X¯t) =
r2α2α¯2f(1Σθ′)2
2(α + α¯)21Σ1′
+
r2α¯2
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
)
(1− yt)
2
2
∆
1Σ1′
. (C.33)
We next substitute (C.33) into (C.5), and identify linear and quadratic terms. Quadratic terms
yield the algebraic Riccati equation
Q¯R¯2Q¯+ Q¯R¯1 + R¯
′
1Q¯− R¯0 = 0, (C.34)
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where
R¯2 ≡


[
β21 +
φ2β2
2
(r+κ)2
+
s2β2
2
γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
]
∆
1Σ1′
s2β2γ2∆
1Σ1′ 0
s2β2γ2∆
1Σ1′ s
2 0
0 0 0

 ,
R¯1 ≡

 r2 + κ+ ρ −ρ 00 r2 + κ 0
b1 0
r
2 + b2

 ,
R¯0 ≡

 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 r2α¯2
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
)
∆
1Σ1′

 .
Terms in Cˆt yield
(r + κ+ ρ) q¯1 + b1q¯3 +
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
]
∆q¯1q¯11
1Σ1′
+ s2
(
β2γ2∆q¯1
1Σ1′
+ q¯2
)(
β2γ2∆q¯11
1Σ1′
+ q¯12
)
− κC¯(q¯11 + q¯12)− b0q¯13 = 0, (C.35)
terms in Ct yield
(r + κ)q¯2 − ρq¯1 +
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
]
∆q¯1q¯12
1Σ1′
+ s2
(
β2γ2∆q¯1
1Σ1′
+ q¯2
)(
β2γ2∆q¯12
1Σ1′
+ q¯22
)
− κC¯(q¯12 + q¯22)− b0q¯23 = 0, (C.36)
and terms in yt yield
(r + b2)q¯3 +
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
]
∆q¯1q¯13
1Σ1′
+ s2
(
β2γ2∆q¯1
1Σ1′
+ q¯2
)(
β2γ2∆q¯13
1Σ1′
+ q¯23
)
+ r2α¯2
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)
∆
1Σ1′
− κC¯(q¯13 + q¯23)− b0q¯33 = 0. (C.37)
Consider next the equations derived from (C.15). Using (C.26) and (C.27), we can write (C.15)
as
r2α2α¯2f(1Σθ′)2
2(α + α¯)21Σ1′
+
r2α2y2t
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
)
2
∆
1Σ1′
+ rαψyt
[
hψ(Xt) +
rαb1k1yt∆
1Σ1′
]
− rα
ψv2t
2
− r
[
q0 + (q1, q2)Xt +
1
2
X ′tQXt
]
+ f1(Xt)κ(C¯ − Cˆt) + f2(Xt)vt
+
1
2
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆[q11 − f1(Xt)
2]
1Σ1′
+ β − r + r log(r) = 0. (C.38)
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We next substitute (45) into (C.38), and identify linear and quadratic terms. Quadratic terms yield
the algebraic Riccati equation
QR2Q+QR1 +R
′
1Q−R0 = 0, (C.39)
where
R2 ≡
( [
β21 +
φ2β2
2
(r+κ)2
+
s2β2
2
γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
]
∆
1Σ1′ 0
0 0
)
,
R1 ≡
(
r
2 + κ rαψb1
[
β21 +
φ2β2
2
(r+κ)2
+
s2β2
2
γ2
2
∆
1Σ1′
]
∆
1Σ1′
b1
r
2 + b2
)
,
R0 ≡
(
−rαψb21 −rαψb1(r + κ+ 2b2)
−rαψb1(r + κ+ 2b2) r
2α2
(
f + k∆
1Σ1′
)
∆
1Σ1′ +
r2α2ψb1k1∆
1Σ1′ − rαψb2(2r + 3b2)
)
.
Terms in Cˆt yield
(r+ κ)q1 + b1q2+
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆q1q11
1Σ1′
− κC¯q11− b0q12 − rαψb0b2 = 0, (C.40)
and terms in yt yield
(r + b2)q2 +
[
β21 +
φ2β22
(r + κ)2
+
s2β22γ
2
2∆
1Σ1′
]
∆(q2q12 + rαψb1q1)
1Σ1′
− κC¯q12 − b0q22
− rαψ
[
b0(r + 2b2) + b1κC¯
]
= 0. (C.41)
Solving for equilibrium amounts to solving the system of (34)-(36), (C.22)-(C.25), (C.29)-
(C.31), (C.34)-(C.37), (C.39)-(C.41) in the unknowns (a0, b0, b1, b2, γ1, γ2, γ3, β1, β2, sˆ
2, q¯1, q¯2, q¯3, Q¯, q1, q2, Q).
This reduces to solving the system of (C.22)-(C.24), (C.29), (C.30), (C.34), (C.39) in the unknowns
(b1, b2, γ1, γ2, γ3, Q¯,Q): given (b1, b2, γ1, γ2, γ3, Q¯,Q), (β1, β2, sˆ
2) can be determined from (34)-(36),
(q¯1, q¯2, q¯3, q1, q2) from the linear system of (C.35)-(C.37), (C.40) and (C.41), and (a0, b0) from (C.25)
and (C.31). [[[To be completed.]]]
Proof of Corollary 7: Stocks’ expected returns are
Et(dRt) =
{
ra0 +
[
g˜1Cˆt + g2Ct + g3yt − κ(γ1 + γ2)C¯ − b0γ3
]
Σp′f
}
dt
=
{
rαα¯f
α+ α¯
1Σθ′
1Σ1′
Σ1′ +
[
g˜1Cˆt + g2Ct + g3yt − k1q¯1 − k2q¯2 + rα¯
(
f +
k∆
1Σ1′
)]
Σp′f
}
dt,
(C.42)
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where the first step follows from (C.1) and the second from (C.25). Eq. (49) follows from (C.42)
by the same arguments as in the proof of Corollary 3.
Proof of Corollary 8: Under gradual adjustment, (B.60) is replaced by
Covt(dRt, dR
′
t′) = Covt
[(
σ + β1γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBDt +
φ
r + κ
(
σ + β2γ1Σp
′
fpfσ
)
dBFt
−sγ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
Σp′fdB
C
t ,
(
g˜1Cˆt′ + g2Ct′ + g3yt′
)
pfΣdt
]
. (C.43)
To compute the covariance (C.43), we proceed as in the proof of Corollary 6 and consider the
impulse-response dynamics
dCt = −κCtdt,
dCˆt =
[
−κCˆt + ρ(Ct − Cˆt)
]
dt,
dyt = −
(
b1Cˆt + b2yt
)
dt,
with the initial conditions
Ct = sdB
C
t ,
Cˆt = −β1pfσdB
D
t − β2
(
φpfσdB
F
t
r + κ
−
sγ2∆dB
C
t
1Σ1′
)
,
yt = 0.
The solution to these dynamics is (B.61), (B.62) and
yt′ = −
b1
b2 − κ
[
e−κ(t
′−t) − e−b2(t
′−t)
]
sdBCt
+
b1
b2 − κ− ρ
[
e−(κ+ρ)(t
′−t) − e−b2(t
′−t)
] [
β1pfσdB
D
t +
φβ2pfσdB
F
t
r + κ
+ s
(
1−
β2γ2∆
1Σ1′
)
dBCt
]
.
(C.44)
Substituting (B.61), (B.62) and (C.44) into (C.43), we find (52) with
χ1 ≡
(
g3b1
b2 − κ− ρ
− g˜1
)
β1
(
1 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
, (C.45)
χ2 ≡ s
2
(
g3b1
b2 − κ
− g˜1 − g2
)
γ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
, (C.46)
χ3 ≡ −
g3b1β1
b2 − κ− ρ
(
1 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
−
s2g3b1γ2
b2 − κ
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
. (C.47)
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The function χ(u) ≡ χ1e
−(κ+ρ)u+χ2e
−κu+χ3e
−b2u has the same sign as χˆ(u) ≡ χ1e
−ρu+χ2+
χ3e
−(b2−κ)u. When u = 0,
χˆ(0) = χ1 + χ2 + χ3 = −g˜1β1
(
1 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
− s2(g˜1 + g2)γ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
> 0.
When u goes to ∞ and b2 > κ, χˆ(u) converges to χ2. Eqs. (B.8), (B.9), (C.2) and (C.3) imply that
χ2 = s
2(r + κ)
(
b1γ3
b2 − κ
− γ1 − γ2
)
γ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
< 0.
When u goes to ∞ and b2 < κ, χˆ(u) is asymptotically equal to χ3e
−(b2−κ)u < 0. Therefore, in
both cases χˆ(u) < 0 for large u. The derivative of χˆ(u) is χˆ′(u) = −χ1ρe
−ρu− χ3(b2 − κ)e
−(b2−κ)u.
When u = 0,
χˆ′(0) = −χ1ρ− χ3(b2 − κ) = (g˜1ρ+ g3b1)β1
(
1 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
+ s2g3b1γ2
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
< 0.
Since χˆ′(u) can change sign at most once, it is either negative, or negative and then positive.
Therefore, χˆ(u) is positive and then negative, and the same is true for χ(u).
Proof of Corollary 9: Since the long-horizon return from time t on is
∫∞
t
dRt′e
−r(t′−t), the
covariance in (53) is
Covt
(
dRt,
∫ ∞
t
dR′t′e
−r(t′−t)
)
=
∫ ∞
t
Covt(dRt, dR
′
t′)e
−r(t′−t)
=
(∫ ∞
0
χ(u)e−rudu
)
Σp′fpfΣdt, (C.48)
where the second step follows from Corollary 8. Using the definition of χ(u), we find
∫ ∞
0
χ(u)e−rudu =
χ1
r + κ+ ρ
+
χ2
r + κ
+
χ3
r + b2
. (C.49)
Substituting (χ1, χ2, χ3) from (C.45)-(C.47) into (C.49), and using (B.8), (B.9), (C.2) and (C.3),
we find
∫ ∞
0
χ(u)e−rudu = −β1γ1
(
1 +
β1γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
− s2γ2(γ1 + γ2)
(
1 +
β2γ1∆
1Σ1′
)
< 0.
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Proof of Corollary 10: When dRt is replaced by dDt, (C.43) is replaced by
Covt(dDt, dR
′
t′) = Covt
[
σdBDt ,
(
g˜1Cˆt′ + g2Ct′ + g3yt′
)
pfΣdt
]
, (C.50)
and when dRt is replaced by dFt, (C.43) is replaced by
Covt(dFt, dR
′
t′) = Covt
[
φσ
r + κ
dBFt ,
(
g˜1Cˆt′ + g2Ct′ + g3yt′
)
pfΣdt
]
. (C.51)
Substituting (B.61), (B.62) and (C.44) into (C.50) and (C.51), we find (54) with
χD1 ≡
(
g3b1
b2 − κ− ρ
− g˜1
)
β1, (C.52)
χD2 ≡ −
g3b1β1
b2 − κ− ρ
. (C.53)
The function χD(u) ≡ χD1 e
−(κ+ρ)u + χD2 e
−b2u is equal to −g˜1β1 > 0 when u = 0. When u goes
to ∞ and b2 > κ + ρ, χ
D(u) is asymptotically equal to χD1 e
−(κ+ρ)u. Eqs. (B.8), (B.9), (C.2) and
(C.3) imply that
χD1 = (r + κ+ ρ)
(
γ3b1
b2 − κ− ρ
− γ1
)
< 0.
When u goes to ∞ and b2 < κ+ ρ, χ
D(u) is asymptotically equal to χD2 e
−b2u < 0. Since χD(u) can
change sign at most once, it is positive and then negative.
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